



To those familiar with the F.3d, qualified immunity needs no in-
troduction. The federal docket is filled with § 1983 civil rights litiga-
tion, and qualified immunity is a government official's first line of de-
fense. Despite its ubiquity, the doctrine is in a perpetual state of
crisis. Since the Supreme Court's seminal decision in Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald in 1982, the Court has addressed the definition, administra-
tion, or application of qualified immunity in at least twenty-four
cases.2 Despite the almost annual ritual of doctrinal clarification, the
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457 U.S. 800 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 24-26 for a discussion of this case.
2 See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 125 S. Ct. 596 (2004) (holding that an officer is shielded
from suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity when he makes a decision that, even if con-
stitutionally deficient, is a reasonable misunderstanding of the law governing the situation),
discussed infra at Part IV.B; Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) (finding that an officer who
violates a citizen's Fourth Amendment rights is deprived of qualified immunity); Chavez v. Mar-
tinez, 538 U.S. 760, 760-61 (2003) (discussing how courts first determine whether officers are
entitled to a qualified immunity defense, by looking at whether the alleged violated plaintiffs
constitutional rights); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 745-46 (2002) (finding that the defense of
qualified immunity was precluded at the summary judgment stage of a case involving cruel and
unusual punishment), discussed infra at Part IV.A; Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 356 (2001)
(discussing how, under certain circumstances, state officials would have to exhaust their quali-
fied immunity claims in tribal court); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 194-95 (2001) (noting that
the inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for the use of excessive
force is separate from the merits of the excessive force itself); Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808,
810 (1999) (holding that federal agents who brought a camera crew onto the respondent's
ranch were entitled to qualified immunity because the Fourth Amendment rights of the re-
spondent were not "clearly established"); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (stating that
the qualified immunity analysis under a § 1983 cause of action and under a Bivens cause of ac-
tion are equivalent), discussed infra at Part IB; Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999) (re-
jecting a "common sense" approach to the immunity question); County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998) (discussing how the court should first look to whether the plaintiff has
alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right, and only then should the court ask whether the
allegedly implicated right was clearly established at the time of the event at issue); Crawford-El
v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998) ("[A] defense of qualified immunity may not be rebutted by
evidence that the defendant's conduct was malicious or otherwise improperly motivated. Evi-
dence concerning the defendant's subjective intent is simply irrelevant to that defense.");
Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 399-400 (1997) (concluding that since prison guards
employed by a private prison management firm do not receive direction from the government,
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federal reporters are crammed with dissents and en banc decisions
taking issue over the proper scope and role of qualified immunity.
This confusion is not accidental. It reflects a fundamental tension
between the immunity doctrine and the conception of law and legal
reasoning that lies at the foundation of the common law's adjudica-
tive techniques.
The current state of the law can be summarized briefly. When a
government official raises the qualified immunity defense, the court
is directed to ask two questions. The first is whether the plaintiff has
alleged a violation of constitutional rights.3 Assuming this question is
answered in the affirmative, the court addresses whether the uncon-
stitutionality of the official conduct was clearly established as of the time
of the violation. The plaintiff can survive summary judgment only if
both questions are answered positively.
4
Each prong, however, reflects a different approach to the reading
and analysis of legal texts. In the first stage, courts read the relevant
case law, extract the holding, and apply it to the next set of facts.
Analogous cases provide support, while contrary authority is effec-
they are not protected by qualified immunity in a § 1983 case); Johnson v. Frankel, 520 U.S.
911, 923 (1997) (holding that there is no federal right to an interlocutory appeal from a state
court's denial of qualified immunity); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270 (1997) (ex-
plaining that "qualified immunity seeks to ensure that defendants reasonably can anticipate
when their conduct may give rise to liability") (internal citations omitted); Behrens v. Pelletier,
516 U.S. 299, 312 (1996) (stating that the "right to immunity is a right to immunity from certain
claimn, not from litigation in general") (emphasis in original); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304,
319-20 (1995) (holding that "a defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may
not appeal a district court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether
or not a pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial"); Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S.
510, 516 (1994) (stating that, in a qualified immunity suit, whether a federal right was clearly
established is a question of law, not of fact); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1992) (hold-
ing that the qualified immunity defense is not "available for private defendants faced with
§ 1983 liability for invoking a state replevin, garnishment, or attachment statute"); Hunter v.
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (stating that qualified immunity exists for reasonable deci-
sions, even if those decisions were mistaken); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991) (hold-
ing that the qualified immunity defense could not be destroyed where plaintiff did not state a
constitutional claim); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (declining to "make an
exception to the general rule of qualified immunity for cases involving allegedly unlawful war-
rantless searches of innocent third parties' homes in search of fugitives"), discussed infra at Part
IB; Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986) (holding that an officer must act reasonably in
applying for a warrant in order to be protected by the qualified immunity defense); Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 520 (1985) (denying qualified immunity is an appealable order); Davis v.
Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984) (holding that a plaintiff who seeks damages for a violation of con-
stitutional or statutory rights may overcome defendant-official's qualified immunity only by
showing that those rights were clearly established at time of the conduct at issue).
See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (requiring a court to determine, as a threshold question to the
qualified immunity analysis, whether the facts show that the officer's conduct violated a consti-
tutional right).
4 See id. (addressing, as sequential steps in the qualified immunity inquiry, whether a consti-
tutional right would have been violated if the plaintiffs allegations were established, and
whether that right was clearly established at the time).
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tively distinguished. The hallmark of this analysis is the supremacy of
the court's reasoning over its wording and even above its bottom-line
holding. As every first-year law student realizes, by virtue of its rea-
soning, a precedent case can be used to support an almost opposite
conclusion. This method of analysis allows holdings to be re-analyzed
at the very moment of application. Each decision is a link in the
evolving chain of the law, rather than the final exposition of legal
doctrine.
The purpose of qualified immunity is to dismiss insubstantial cases
at the outset of the litigation. Towards this end, the Court has devel-
oped a system that short-circuits the law's analytical process and fo-
cuses instead on "clearly established" statements of blackletter, almost
codified, law. The second prong of the immunity analysis asks
whether the illegality was clearly established and looks for a prece-
dent that states black and white that the conduct is prohibited. This
method is reminiscent of reading detailed codes rather than com-
mon law cases. Unlike cases, codes are, ideally, designed to clearly
define a series of legal rights and obligations. A codified regime pre-
sents a comprehensive solution to the various doctrinal and interpre-
tive problems plaguing any area of the law. Reducing law to a code,
seeks to end, rather than encourage, the evolution of legal doctrine. 5
The problem arises when these two systems of legal interpretation
attempt to operate together. Substantive constitutional tort doctrines
are cast decidedly in the common law mode.6 But this method does
5 There are, of course, complex questions of interpretation that require detailed analysis of
a code's language, history, scope, application, and the like. However, these questions arise be-
cause of the shortcomings of the code, whether avoidable or unavoidable. Ideally, a code would
not raise difficult questions of interpretation. This contrasts sharply with common law cases
that do not even attempt to generate and catalogue a collection of rules to be applied by future
decision makers.
6 There is, of course, a vigorous and lively debate as to whether the common law model is
appropriate for constitutional interpretation. Justice Scalia, in particular, has been a vocal critic
of the idea that the common law should serve as a model for constitutional interpretation. See
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, 3-14 (1997);
see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia argues:
Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to
create causes of action-decreeing them to be "implied" by the mere existence of a
statutory or constitutional prohibition. As the Court points out.., we have abandoned
that power.... There is even greater reason to abandon it in the constitutional field,
since an "implication" imagined in the Constitution can presumably not even be repudi-
ated by Congress.
Id. whatever the status of Scalia's view as a normative matter, as a descriptive matter, the evolu-
tion of constitutional tort doctrine proceeds largely on common law terms. See generally David
A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996) (contrasting
the common law method to other means of constitutional interpretation); see also Henry P.
Monaghan, Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975) (exploring the role
and authority of extra-textual constitutional law created by the Court's opinions).
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not naturally generate the types of holdings likely to be considered
"clearly established." The source of the unending doctrinal instability
is that the Court asks lower courts to merge two incompatible meth-
ods of legal analysis. Finally, because the Supreme Court has yet to
address the conceptual gulf or interpretive differences in reading
common law and statutory texts, its numerous attempts to harmonize
immunity doctrine have failed.
Mothers never cease to tell us that "you never appreciate some-
thing until it is taken away." The same holds true for legal analysis.
This article explains the administrative and analytical difficulties pre-
sented by qualified immunity resulting from the doctrine's rejection
of the traditional approach to reading, writing, and analyzing cases.
The immunity inquiry reflects an emaciated version of common law
thinking, and, in essence, asks the law to proceed without its interpre-
tive and operational assumptions. These methodologies, however,
cut to the core of the common law's coherence as an adjudicative sys-
tem. Just as a car cannot run without an engine, the common law
stalls and sputters when divested of its adjudicative mechanisms. In
addition to doctrinal observations, qualified immunity law affords the
opportunity to examine the confluence between the common law's
literary, prudential, and interpretative assumptions. The two-tiered
immunity inquiry conveniently places the results of each system side-
by-side, making for an effective comparative review.
This article begins by discussing how the Supreme Court arrived
at the code-inspired method of legal analysis featured in the immu-
nity decisions. Part II examines the interaction between the immu-
nity standard and the traditional mode of common law interpreta-
tion. Part III reflects on the unique difficulty presented by the
"clearly established" doctrine decided under totality-of-the-
More importantly, the types of cases discussed in this article largely avoid the issues debated
by Scalia and his interlocutors. Almost by definition, cases that raise difficult questions as to
whether the law was "clearly established" are not those in which the Court engages in free-
ranging constitutional interpretation-as even the most ardent critic of the doctrine would be
sympathetic to official immunity in those cases. Rather, I am concerned with instances where
the "clearly established" question is close, which means that the constitutional right, broadly
defined, has already been established (clearly or otherwise). Even tinder Scalia's view, localized
applications of constitutional principles to specific facts rarely turn on constitutional herme-
neutics. The cases discussed below were decided almost exclusively by reference to the Court's
own precedents and articulated policies. Neither constitutional text, nor Eighteenth century
common law plays a significant role in the disposition of qualified immunity in these cases. See,
e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (using case-by-case analysis, rather than constitutional
text or Eighteenth century common law to grant qualified immunity); Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 644 (1987) (refusing to limit the contours of official immunity to the often arcane
rules of the common law). For our purposes then, "common law" refers to the "law's elabora-
tion from case to case," and to the uncontroversial view that specific details of constitutional
tort doctrine are developed sequentially and incrementally by the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
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circumstances general standards. Part IV then applies the lessons of
the previous sections to explain the tension between the Supreme
Court's two most recent qualified immunity decisions. Finally, Part V
closes by commenting on two meta-lessons brought to the forefront
by the side-by-side comparison of these two modes of legal interpreta-
tion. I argue that, despite the wholesale theoretical rejection of the
classical mythology of the common law, in practice, these myths con-
tinue to shape the form and structure of contemporary legal analysis.
I. CASES AND CODES
A. Analytic Structure of the Early Immunity Cases
Qualified immunity began as a privilege to the emerging class of
federal constitutional torts. The Court's first qualified immunity
case, Pierson v. Ray," involved a § 1983 claim against an officer who
had initiated an arrest pursuant to a statute that would later be de-
clared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.9 In a short paragraph,
the Court held that the common law rule that a police officer is not
liable for a false arrest simply because the suspect's innocence is later
proven "require Es] excusing him from liability for acting under a
statute that he reasonably believed to be valid but that was later held
unconstitutional. .... ",,1 The Court went on to note that "police offi-
7 As federal civil rights law was developing, the Supreme Court determined that in enacting
§ 1983, Congress did not mean to abrogate traditional common law immunities. Thus, the
court affirmed absolute judicial immunity in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), prosecutorial
immunity in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), and legislative immunity in Tenny v. Brand-
hove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), from federal and constitutional torts. More complete overviews of
the evolution of immunity doctrine can be found in: Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Quali-
fied Immunity in the Age of Constitutional Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261, 267 (1995) [herein-
after Chen, The Ultimate Standard] (suggesting that "framing the immunity doctrine as a stan-
dard distorts the advantages of both constitutional rules and constitutional standards"); Alan K.
Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts in Constitutional
Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1997) [hereinafter Chen, Burdens of Qualified Immunity] (argu-
ing that "courts and commentators alike have failed to appreciate that factual issues are an in-
herent part of the qualified immunity inquiry .. .. "); Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of
Qualified Immunity, 64 Mo. L. REV. 123 (1999) (noting the conflicting ways in which courts have
administered the qualified immunity defense). A comprehensive historical overview of immu-
nity doctrine can be found in Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability,
37 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 396 (1986-87) (exploring "two historical models for evaluating gov-
ernment officials' claims for immunity from civil liability, and the relation of those models to
the qualified immunity currently applicable to most executive officers").
8 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
9 See Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524, 524 (1965) (finding the Mississippi statute, under
which the arrest was issued, unconstitutional); Pierson, 386 U.S. at 550 (noting the unconstitu-
tionality of the statute at issue in Thomas).
10 Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555.
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cer[s are] not charged with predicting the future course of constitu-
tional law."" Qualified immunity was thus born.
Pierson's analytic structure presented little difficulty or novelty.
The case merely extended the good-faith defense to include reliance
on a facially valid statute." The next few cases similarly hewed to a
traditional line. 3  It was not until Wood v. Strickland14 that the Court
offered the distinction between law and "clearly established" law.'
Wood, however, gave little guidance as to what exactly distinguished* 16
these two categories -a question the Court did not face until Procu-
nier v. Navarette.' Navarette involved liability of prison officials for in-
terfering with the mail privileges of inmate Navarette.' s In the time
between when Navarette's rights were allegedly infringed and the
case's consideration in the Supreme Court, the Court had decided
Procunier v. Martinez,'9 which granted some constitutional privileges to
prisoners' outgoing mail. 20  Because Martinez was decided after the
conduct at issue in Navarette, the Court held that even if it were to
find the conduct unconstitutional it could not have been clearly es-
tablished at the time of the alleged offense.2' Immunity was granted
"as a matter of law" because the officials "could not reasonably have
been expected to be aware of a right that has not yet been de-
clared.",2"2
11 Id. at 557.
12 In these early cases, the qualified immunity doctrine seemed rather unremarkable. Nota-
bly, Justice Douglas's Pierson dissent passes over the qualified immunity issue and criticizes the
majority's grant of absolute immunity for judicial officers. Id. at 558-67 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (analyzing immunity in terms of tradi-
tional common law immunity considerations); see also Woolhandler, supra note 7, at 465-66,
(charting the evolution of common law immunity doctrine).
14 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
15 Id. at 321-22 (explaining that a "clearly established" law is such that an officer's "action
cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith"). In light of the subsequent history,
it is interesting to note that the pro-immunity dissenters were suspicious of the "objective" part
of the immunity test, but favored the "subjective" component. Of course in Harlow, the Court
drogped the "subjective" factor and the doctrine now rests exclusively on the "objective" half.
The Wood dissenters predicted this problem. See Wood, 420 U.S. at 329 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) ("The Court states the standard of required knowledge in two cryptic phrases .... ").
434 U.S. 555 (1978).
18 Id. at 556-57 ("Naverette, an inmate... charg[ed] six prison officials with various types of
conduct allegedly violative of his constitutional rights... ").
19 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
20 See Navarette, 434 U.S. at 563 (describing how Martinez offered these protections).
2 Id. at 565 ("Because they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a consti-
tutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act with such disregard for the
established law .... ").
22 Id. In a dissent signaling things to come,Justice Stevens raised several red flags regarding
the Court's understanding of clearly established law. He warned of the dangers of a contextual
immunity analysis, accusing the majority of "chang[ing] the nature of the defense and over-
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Butz v. Economou," refrained the policy goals of qualified immunity
by focusing on immunity from suit rather than from liability. This
idea became the centerpiece of the Court's analysis in Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald.24 In that seminal opinion, the Court openly noted that a cen-
tral goal of qualified immunity is to reduce the social costs of consti-
tutional tort litigation: the increased expense to the government, the
diversion of official attention from official duties, and the deterrence
of able citizens from pursuing public office. 5 In light of these goals,
the Court held that determinations of immunity should involve only
one question, whether the official actions were "objectively reason-
able," with reasonableness to be determined "as a matter of law" by
the court on summary judgment.
26
B. Codification of the Common Law?
When the Court issued Harlow it had only limited experience dis-
tinguishing between "law" and "clearly established law." Navarette27
and Pierson were the only cases that turned on a version of this dis-
29tinction. In each of these cases, however, the distinction was fairly
obvious. In Pierson, the official relied on a statute that the Supreme
Court thereafter declared unconstitutional . Similarly, in Navarette,
the Court issued an interceding opinion recognizing a new category
of prisoners' rights.3' The Court's pre-Harlow experience allowed it to
overlook what would become a much more difficult question: What
happens when the law changes-not at the level of headline-grabbing
Supreme Court cases overruling past precedents or recognizing newly
minted constitutional rights-but in the evolving common law way,
look[ing] the critical importance of carefully examining the factual basis for the defense in
each case in which it is asserted." Id. at 569.
23 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
24 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
25 Id. at 814.
26 Id. at 819.
27 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
28 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
Examination of the qualified immunity cases decided after Wood (which created the
"clearly established" inquiry) and before Harlow, turned up only two cases where the decision
turned on the distinction between "law" and "clearly established law". Notably, both cases fol-
lowed the Navarette model, where the law was found unclear because of intervening Supreme
Court cases announcing new rights. See, e.g., Raffone v. Robinson, 607 F.2d 1058, 1061 (2d Cir.
1979) (granting qualified immunity on the basis of an interceding Supreme Court decision); see
also McGhee v. Draper, 564 F.2d 902, 914-15 (10th Cir. 1977) (granting qualified immunity on
the basis of an interceding Supreme Court decision). Thus, prior to Harlow, no case addressed
the "law" or "clearly established law" question in the context of ordinary common law develop-
ment.
30 Pierson, 386 U.S. at 550.
31 Navarette, 434 U.S. at 563.
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by which the law changes slowly and incrementally. This question
continues to plague the Court.2
Five years after Harlow,33 Anderson v. Creightons" squarely presented
this issue. Agent Anderson was searching for a bank robber when he
barged into the Creighton home without a warrant. The search
failed to uncover the bank robber, and a Bivens action ensued.5
Anderson maintained that he was entitled to summary judgment if he
could establish as a matter of law that a reasonable officer would have
thought the search lawful. The Court of Appeals rejected this ap-
proach, finding that the unconstitutionality of warrantless searches,
which lacked probable cause and exigent circumstances, was already
"clearly established."'3 6
Justice Scalia's Anderson opinion sets forth the problem as follows:
the operation of the qualified immunity standard "depends substan-
tially upon the level of generality at which the relevant 'legal rule' is
to be identified., 37 At the broadest level of generality, the constitu-
tional phrase "Due Process" would clearly establish any and all due
process violations. However, Scalia opined that "the right the official
is alleged to have violated must have been 'clearly established' in a
more particularized, and hence more relevant sense: The contours
of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right. 3 s Anderson has
had a far-reaching effect on qualified immunity holdings. It seems
that the plaintiff must now cite specific cases showing that the par-
ticular conduct (or something very close to it) has previously been
declared unlawful. This question is decided by the court, "as a matter
of law," at the outset of the lawsuit.
39
32 The Court probably did not appreciate the gravity of this problem. Qualified immunity's
formative period was during, or right after, an era of wide-ranging expansion of constitutional
and civil rights. If every term brought about new constitutional rights and duties, the distinc-
tion between "law" and "clearly established law" could be easily found within the U.S. Reporters.
If an interceding case declared a new obligation, that obligation was obviously not "clearly es-
tablished" prior to the Court's announcement. Navarette and Pierson provided the Court with a
neat, but oversimplified distinction between "law" and "clearly established law." See Linda
Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters: Teague and New Rules," 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 424 (1994)
(making similar observations regarding Teague analyses).
3 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
34 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
35 Id. at 637. A Bivens action seeks damages for constitutional violations committed by fed-
eral agents where no specific statute expressly authorizes a grant of relief. See Bivens v. 6 Un-
known Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
36 Id. at 637-38.
37 Id. at 639.
M Id. at 640.
39 This feature of immunity doctrine is discussed more fully in Chen, Burdens of Qualified Im-
munity, supra note 7, at 37-43.
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The impact of this analytical framework is demonstrated by the
Court's decision in Wilson v. Layne," where officers invited members
of the media to "ride along" with police as they executed an arrest
warrant.4' As police barged into the Wilson home and executed the
search, media cameramen took several rounds of photographs. The
media crew, however, did not play any part in the warrant's execu-
tion.42 Because the media acted for private purposes and did not fur-
ther any law enforcement objectives, the Supreme Court had an easy
time holding that inviting the media on the search violated Wilson's
constitutional rights. 43 The real issue was whether these rights were
"clearly established" at the time of the violative conduct. In granting
qualified immunity, the Court reached for its mantra developed in
earlier cases that police officers were not required to "predict the fu-
ture course of constitutional law." 4 Despite finding the conduct un-
constitutional, the officers were granted qualified immunity. Since
there was no case specifically prohibiting police from inviting the
media into a search, the law was "undeveloped," and not "clearly es-
tablished."
Justice Stevens's dissent strikes to the heart of the difficulty. Ste-
vens conceptualized the case as a refusal to grant an "unprecedented
request for an exception to a well-established principle," not a newly
developed legal obligation." Since precedents dating back to Se-
mayne's CaseY4 in 1604 established the legal principle that "the house
of every one is to him as his castle and fortress" there was little novelty
in Wilson's holding and no reason to grant immunity. The dissent
suggests that media "ride-alongs" were no more permitted in 1604
than in 1997.47 In other words, the common law contains rules that
are a part of the "law" even if a court has never proclaimed them as
such. While new instances may arise, at the level of doctrine, the law
does not change. This view of the law concords with the traditional
theory that courts apply preexisting legal rules to emerging fact pat-
terns.
40 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
41 Id. at 607.
42 Id. at 608.
43 Id. at 609-14.
44 Id. at 617 (quoting Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978)).
45 Id. at 619 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (KB. 1604).
47 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 622-23 (suggesting that the doctrine set forth Semayne's Case has re-
mained good law continuously since it was decided).
Oct. 2005]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
C. The Troubled Merger
According to the Anderson and Wilson majorities, the distinction
between "law" and "clearly established law" can be thought of as the
difference between interpreting cases and interpreting codes. "Law"
is determined by engaging the traditional interpretive techniques of
the case method. "Clearly established law," however, assumes that
cases should be read like legislated codes. 48 In the common law
mode, new or evolving decisions are teased out from existing law, and
the law's rhetorical posture conceptualizes emerging decisions as
embedded or implied within existing ones. Under this traditional
approach, the law is understood to contain a stratum of implied prin-
ciples that lurk under, over, and behind decided case law. 49  This
method of legal interpretation was displayed in Wilson: in determin-
ing whether police conduct violated the Constitution, the Court re-
ferred to its holdings in Horton v. California,5 0 Arizona v. Hicks,5' and
48 In their 1991 article, New Law, Non-Retroactivity and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1731 (1991), Professors Richard H. Fallon and Daniel J. Meltzer point out that the Su-
preme Court's jurisprudence regarding the doctrine of non-retroactivity in habeas corpus,
qualified immunity, and tax refund cases sounded a definitive note of legal positivism. Positiv-
ism, which they trace back to Austin, holds that the law's legitimacy stems from the law being
the command of the ruling sovereign. Id. at 1758. Austinian positivism eschews the legal and
especially moral/legal reasoning, arguing that all law is predicated on the authority of the law-
maker. Since legal authority stems from the source of its declaration, rather than any intrinsic
properties, positivists generally de-emphasize the analytical progression and logical connection
from one case to the next.
Fallon and Meltzer contrast this model to the Blackstonian tradition, which understands law
to be discovered rather than declared. Id. Law is viewed as part of a seamless web of legal doc-
trine, where legal reasoning plays a large role in creating and justifying the law. Id. at 1759. It
is, therefore, important for each court to justify a new decision in light of the existing legal ma-
terials and doctrines. Because all law is essentially old and "discovered" by the court, retroactiv-
ity poses little conceptual difficulty. Each case is decided by a court reaching into the store-
house of legal doctrines and finding the correct pre-existing rule. Thus, litigants are always on
notice. See id. at 1758-64 (discussing the question of whether law is made or found).
Fallon and Meltzer also describe how each of these views has a modern proponent. H.L.A.
Hart is the heir to Austin's positivism, while Ronald Dworkin inherited most of the Blackstonian
view. Id. at 1759-60.
Building on the work of Fallon and Meltzer, Professor Linda Meyer discusses the implica-
tions of positivism and retroactivity as it is reflected in the Supreme Court's habeas corpus ju-
risprudence. See Meyer, supra note 32. Meyer seeks to explain that the trouble with the habeas
doctrine is that the common law's holding/dicta distinction is at odds with the positivist
new/old distinction mandated by Teague. See id. at 426. While I agree with many of the obser-
vations made by Professors Fallon, Meltzer, and Meyer, in this Article, I have adopted an alter-
nate set of terms designed to stress other aspects of common law traditions of legal analysis and
interpretation.
49 See LON FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 43-120 (1962) (contrasting statutory and common
law reasoning).
50 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990) (discussing the necessary correlation between the warrant and
the scope of the search).
51 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) (holding that taking action beyond the warrant's objectives pro-
duced a "new invasion").
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Maryland v. Garrison,12 and discovered that the Fourth Amendment
required police actions to relate to the objective of the authorized in-
trusion. Proceeding from these premises, the Court found media
ride-alongs unconstitutional."
In moving to the "clearly established" inquiry, however, Anderson
and Wilson switched gears. Here, the conception of "law" is limited to
a catalogue of codified provisions.54 The ideal clearly established
principle, like the ideal code provision, applies unambiguously to the
presented set of facts. Just as the ideal code articulates all the excep-
tions to the rule at the outset, "clearly established" law requires any
exceptions to be articulated at the outset and rejects the interpretive
method that modifies the rules at the moment of application. Pursu-
ing this stance, the Court held that immunity would be granted
unless the plaintiff could produce a black and white case demonstrat-
ing that the particular conduct had been previously held unconstitu-
tional. Like the ideal code, the "clearly established" inquiry eschews
any norm or interpretive gesture from outside the limited canon of
formally recognized law. Common sense, moral outrage, or police
department regulations are irrelevant from the perspective of "clearly
established law.,'
'
In Saucier v. Katz, 6 the Court spelled out two additions to qualified
immunity doctrine. 57 First, the Court made explicit what it had been
suggesting for some time: that the question of "clearly established
law" was procedurally and analytically distinct from the question of
whether the conduct itself was illegal. Saucier further directed courts
to address these questions in a particular order. Courts are first to
52 480 U.S. 79, 87 (1987) (recognizing "the need to allow some latitude for honest mistakes
that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult process of making arrests and executing
search warrants").
53 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 611 (1999) ("[T]he purposes justifying a police search
strictly limit the permissible extent of the search ....").
54 This issue is profitably discussed in Fredrick Schauer and Virginia J. Wise, Nonlegal Infor-
mation and the Delegalization of Law, 29J. LEGAL STUD. 495 (2000).
5 Fredrick Schauer recently wrote about the approach to law that relies solely on "pedi-
greed legal materials" in The Limited Domain of the Law, 90 VA. L. REV. 1909 (2004) [hereinafter
Schauer, The Limited Domain of the Law].
56 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
57 Saucier was not the Supreme Court's final word on the topic. In the past few terms, the
Court has revisited qualified immunity in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), and in Brosseau v.
Haugen, 125 S. Ct. 596 (2004). These cases are discussed, infra in Part IV.
See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (explaining that the Court must first ask the threshold question
of whether the behavior violated a constitutional right, before separately determining if the rule
was "clearly established"). The development of this doctrine is laid out in 1B MARTIN SCHWARTZ
&JOHN KiRKIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 9.36 (3d ed. 1997). Prior to
Saucier, some courts combined these two inquiries asking only if the law was clearly established.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 1547, 1557 (10th Cir. 1995) (granting police officer defen-
dants qualified immunity, but muddling the distinction between the constitutional violation
and clearly established prongs).
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determine whether a constitutional violation has been alleged. As-
suming the affirmative, the court turns to the "clearly established" in-
quiry.
Saucids second innovation concerns a particular subset of immu-
nity cases that greatly confused lower courts. 60 The problem was in-
troduced by Graham v. Connor,61 which maintains that an officer vio-
lates the Fourth Amendment when excessive force is used to affect an
arrest. Under Graham, applications of force are judged under an ob-
jectively reasonable standard. Saucier confronts how this "objectively
reasonable" test, which is part of the substantive constitutional doc-
trine interacts with the "objectively reasonable" test that lies at the
center of the qualified immunity doctrine. The lower Court of Ap-
peals in Saucier decided that because the immunity inquiry asks the
same question as the substantive constitutional standard-whether
the conduct is objectively reasonable-the additional immuniV in-
quiry is unnecessary, and the jury should decide the entire issue.
59 See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. It is worth noting that in Saucier, the Supreme Court did not
follow its own advice:
Because we granted certiorari only to determine whether qualified immunity was appro-
priate, however, and because of the limits imposed upon us by the questions on which we
granted review, we will assume a constitutional violation could have occurred under the
facts alleged based simply on the general rule prohibiting excessive force, then proceed
to the question whether this general prohibition against excessive force was the source
for clearly established law that was contravened in the circumstances this officer faced.
There was no contravention under this standard.
Id. at 207-08. More recently, the Court, once again, ignored its own instructions in Brosseaw
"We exercise our summary reversal procedure here simply to correct a clear misapprehension
of the qualified immunity standard," 125 S. Ct. at 598 n.3, and "[w]e express no view as to the
correctness of the Court of Appeals' decision on the constitutional question itself. We believe
that, however that question is decided, the Court of Appeals was wrong on the issue of qualified
immunity," id. at 598. As indicated below, the Court ignores its own directives in order to avoid
the conceptual difficulties in distinguishing between the two phases of qualified immunity law.
As these cases demonstrate, this issue is particularly sensitive in general standard contexts. See
infra notes 154-65 and accompanying text (discussing how and when the general standard re-
gime appears).
60 See, e.g., Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A User's Manual, 26 IND. L. REv. 187, 218-23
(1993) (reviewing qualified immunity and the Fourth Amendment excessive force standard);
Chen, The Ultimate Standard, supra note 7, at 333 (examining the qualified immunity doctrine as
both a standard and a rule); Lisa Eskow & Kevin W. Cole, The Unqualified Paradoxes of Qualified
Immunity: Reasonably Mistaken Beliefs, Reasonably Unreasonable Conduct, and the Specter of Subjective
Intent that Haunts Objective Legal Reasonableness, 50 BAYLOR L. REv. 869, 881-88 (1998) (discuss-
ing standards of unreasonable conduct in the context of excessive force); see also MARTIN A.
SCHWARTZ & JOHN F. KIRKIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 9.36 (3d ed.
1999) (collecting numerous cases grappling with this issue).
61 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
62 Id. at 388.
63 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200. Interestingly, just four days before the Supreme Court published
Saucier, the Tenth Circuit issued Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2001), in which the
debate between Judges Tacha and Seymour prefigured the majority and dissent in Saucier.
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Saucier rejected this approach. The Supreme Court stressed that
the immunity analysis should be kept analytically and temporally dis-
tinct from the underlying substantive rule. The excessive force ques-
tion is to be answered contextually, taking into account a variety of
facts, "including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight. 6 4 Immunity, by contrast, is addressed solely via reference to
positive law. So long as no case ever specifically stated that this con-




D. Qualified Immunity Comes Full Circle
Saucier v. Katz brings immunity law full circle.66 The case contrasts
the doctrine's common law origins with the code-based structure im-
posed more recently by the Court.6 7 The analysis seems duplicative
because it directly contrasts two versions of immunity. The substan-
tive standards set forth in Graham v. Connor stem directly from the of-
ficer's privilege at common law to make a warrantless arrest based
upon probable cause without fear of retributive suit.68 This older vi-
sion of immunity is currently reflected in the context-sensitive Graham
factors, which provide the officer with a zone of protection for mis-
calculations taken in good faith and in furtherance of legitimate gov-
ernment purposes.-
However, after a generation of doctrinal restructuring, qualified
immunity could not recognize itself. Many courts were confused as to
how to reconcile the new code-based standard analyzed "as a matter
of law" with its context-sensitive forbear.
64 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
65 Id. at 206.
66 The Court's most recent qualified immunity holding, Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), is
discussed infra in Part 1V.A.
67 Not surprisingly, this issue confused many lower courts. Conflicting cases are collected in
SCHWARTZ & KIRKIN, supra note 60, at § 9.36.
68 The progression of this doctrine can be seen by contrasting earlier with later cases. Com-
pare Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 643, 645 (1878) ("If the facts and circumstances before the officer
are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offence has been
committed, it is sufficient."), with Henry v. United States., 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) ("if the offi-
cer acts with probable cause, he is protected even though it turns out that the citizen is inno-
cent."), and Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) (holding that objective reasonableness
of officers' conduct must be analyzed before analyzing the officers' subjective intent), and Gra-
ham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) ("[H]owever, the 'reasonableness' inquiry in an ex-
cessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are 'objec-
tively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to
their underlying intent or motivation.").
69 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-99.
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Sauciers answer is telling, and provides an encapsulated history of
the doctrine's evolution. For qualified immunity purposes, "objec-
tive" no longer means what a prudent person would consider reason-
able under the circumstances;'" rather, it refers to the match between
the government official's conduct and cases enunciating clearly estab-
lished principles. According to Saucier, the difference between these
two versions of the "objectively reasonable" test is the difference be-
tween "law" and "clearly established law.",7' The context-sensitive
standards expressed in Graham are "law," while "clearly established
law" is decided at the outset of the case, before the factual account is
fully developed. As long as the plaintiff fails to find a case which, like
a code provision, specifically attests to the illegality of the conduct,
immunity is likely to be granted.
The next two sections explore the effects of reading cases like
codes, and are divided into two categories. The first set examines
rule refinement cases that focus on the law's elaboration from case to
case. The second set looks at cases decided under totality-of-the-
circumstances tests, or general standard cases. While the distinction
between rule refinement and general standard cases is obviously
somewhat imprecise, these divisions illuminate two types of concerns
arising from the tension between immunity doctrine and prevailing
methods of legal interpretation. The rule refinement discussion
stresses how legal interpretation is influenced by internal interpretive
considerations, while the general standard cases focus on the role of
extra-legal considerations.
II. CASE-BY-CASE ADJUDICATION
A. Source Material: Recent Immunity Decisions
Under Saucier, courts faced with a claim of qualified immunity are
to answer two questions. Was the conduct unconstitutional? And was
it clearly established? 7  While Saucier clarified the analytic scheme,
the conceptual difference between these two questions remains un-
certain. When will a rule be sufficiently anticipated by prior holdings
to be considered "law" but not so anticipated as to be deemed "clearly
70 See, e.g., Heny, 361 U.S. at 102 (discussing whether the facts and circumstances are such as
to warrant a prudent man's belief that an offense had been committed); Stacey, 97 U.S. at 645
(referring to what a man of prudence and caution would believe under the facts and circum-
stances).
71 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (stating that the Court will first determine
whether a constitutional right would have been "violated on the facts alleged," and, if so, will
then determine whether that right was clearly established).
72 See supra note 48 (discussing reading cases as legislative codes).
73 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200.
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established law"? Unless the precedent case includes exactly the
same facts (in which case it is highly unlikely that the case would be
litigated), some degree of case-to-case reasoning is undoubtedly re-
quired. The tension is intensified because Saucier/Brosseau mandate
that courts first ask whether the conduct was illegal, and only then
decide whether it was really illegal.4  Placing these two inquiries side-
by-side puts courts in the awkward position of conducting the same
analysis twice, yet reaching opposite results.75 This problem becomes
clearer through several examples.
In Savard v. Rhode Island,' the First Circuit, sitting en banc, at-
tempted to define the line between the two prongs of immunity
analysis." The question in Savard was whether the rule announced in
the court's previous decision of Roberts v. Rhode Islands was clearly es-
tablished when decided. 79 Roberts involved a § 1983 suit that contested
the constitutionality of a policy mandating a strip-search of every de-
tainee admitted to the Rhode Island prison facility.80 Plaintiff Roberts
claimed that, as applied to non-violent, non-drug related detainees
arrested for misdemeanors, this prison policy violated the Fourth
Amendment."'
In Roberts, the court found the facts to lie between two established
lines of precedents.82 On the one hand was the Supreme Court's
opinion in Bell v. Wolfish,83 which upheld strip searches of pretrial de-
tainees who came into contact with people from outside the prison
even in the absence of any individualized suspicion. s4 Bell stated that
in the prison context, constitutional infringements "must be evalu-
ated in the light of the central objective of prison administration,
safeguarding institutional security," and that this evaluation should
74 In both cases, the Supreme Court ignored its own mandate to the lower courts. See supra
note 59 (discussing how the Court ignored its own directives in Saucier and Brosseau).
75 See Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 914 (5th Cir. 1998) ("We have observed before that the
qualified immunity analysis partakes of a somewhat 'schizophrenic' nature."). As explained
supra in note 32, it is unlikely that the court anticipated this outcome.
76 338 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2003).
See id. at 32 ("We are mindful that there is a distinction for qualified immunity purposes
between an unconstitutional but objectively reasonable act and a blatantly unconstitutional
act.") (citations omitted).
78 239 F.3d 107, 113 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Logan v. Shenly, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir.
1981)) ("An indiscriminate strip search policy routinely applied... can not be justified simply
on the basis of administrative ease in attending to security considerations.").
79 Savard, 338 F.3d at 23.
80 Roberts, 239 F.3d at 107.
8I Id. at 108.
82 See id. at 111 ("The institutional security concerns in play here fall somewhere between
those exhibited in Swain, which were insufficient to support a search, and those in Arruda and
Bel4 which made broad-based searches without individual suspicion reasonable.").
83 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
84 Id. at 540.
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defer to the "professional expertise of correctional officials. 8  The
search in Bell was justified because the search policy conformed with
the goals and policies of penal institutions. 6 Arruda v. Fai 7 was de-
cided in the same spirit. There, the court upheld strip-searches per-
formed on dangerous inmates who had entered particularly sensitive
areas of a maximum-security prison.8'
The First Circuit's decision in Swain v. Spinny9 offered a different
interpretation of the Bell standard. Swain involved a detainee who
was strip-searched upon intake to the prison facility. In Swain, the
First Circuit held that, as applied to prisoners confined in local jails
for minor offenses, Bell required officials to first develop individual-
ized reasonable suspicion that the inmate possessed contraband be-
fore conducting strip-searches. 90
While Roberts recognized that its facts were somewhere between
the two lines of precedent, the court found the strip-search policy
unconstitutional. Bell and Arruda were distinguished because those
searches were limited to occasions when the threat of contraband was
at its highest-after the prisoners had been in contact with individu-
als who came from the outside-a condition absent from Roberts.!]
The court also noted that, unlike in Bell and Arruda, the prison popu-
lation in Roberts included persons picked up off the street for simple
misdemeanors. 2 Since these persons were hardly expecting to wind
up in jail, they were unlikely to be carrying contraband with intent to
smuggle it into the prison complex.93
Savard presented class action claims of detainees who were sub-
jected to the strip-searches declared unconstitutional by Roberts. A
First Circuit panel had denied prison officials qualified immunity,9'
but upon rehearing en banc, the Savard court split four-to-four and
reinstated the district court's grant of immunity.8 '
The plurality in Savard retraced Roberts's steps from Swain to Ar-
ruda finding that "both [cases] offer[ed] valuable insights, but that
85 Id. at 547-48.
86 Id. at 560.
87 710 F.2d 886, 887 (1st Cir. 1983) ("[T]here is nothing in the record here that indicates
that strip searches were conducted in a more intrusive or demeaning fashion than those in Wolf-
ish.").
88 Id. at 888.
117 F.3d 1,8 (lst Cir. 1997).
90 See id. at 6 (concluding that under Bell, "[a] strip and visual body cavity search thus re-
quires independent analysis under the Fourth Amendment").
81 See Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111 ("[U]nlike in Bell or Arruda, Rhode Island does not limit its
searches to prisoners who have had contact with outside visitors.").
82 Id. at 112.
93 Id. at 111.
Savard v. Rhode Island, 320 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 2003).
95 Savard v. Rhode Island, 338 F.3d 23, 33-34 (lst Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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neither is a very exact match. 96 The plurality agreed with Roberts that
the facts were somewhere in between the relevant precedents, 7 but
concluded that Roberts was not "clearly established" when decided.""
The court was troubled, however, as to why, when examined as a mat-
ter of "law," Roberts was found to lay on the Swain side of the line
(finding the conduct illegal), but when examined under "clearly es-
tablished law," Roberts belonged to the Arruda side (finding the gov-
ernment's actions legitimate)."9 The court answered that for pur-
poses of qualified immunity, ambiguity will always be resolved in favor
of the defendant government official. 00 Since the entire en banc
court recognized that the "strip search policy fell into the gray area
between Swain and Arruda,"'O' immunity would be granted so long as
the facts were distinguishable "in a fair way" from Swain.1°'
The dissent 103 traversed substantially the same grounds yet reached
the opposite conclusion. The dissenters did not understand why
qualified immunity should resurrect a claim (arguing that the strip-
search policy is constitutional) firmly rejected in Roberts.
10 4
No fewer than four published court opinions agreed that Roberts
lies somewhere between the Swain and Arruda.10 Further, every judge
who reviewed the case agreed that the Rhode Island prison's strip-
search policy was closer to Swain than to Arruda and, therefore, un-
constitutional. 0 6 Under the "law" standard, the analysis was relative;
the judges examined which precedent provided a better match and
ruled accordingly.
The unanimity broke when it came to the "clearly established"
question. Here, the fact that Rhode Island's policy was found to be in
the gray area meant that immunity would be resolved in favor of the
96 Id. at 30.
97 See id. at 32 ("This case, as we said in [Roberts], fell along neither axis, but, rather, into the
tenebrous middle.") (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 30 ("ACI's strip search policy fell
into the gray area between Swain and Arruda.").
98 Id. at 32.
99 See id. at 30 (finding that Roberts fell into a "gray area").
1oo Id. at 33.
101 Id. at 30.
102 Id.
103 The en banc First Circuit split four-to-four and, therefore, technically generated no hold-
ing. In this case, the First Circuit's procedure was to vacate the panel opinion and reinstate the
district court's holding granting qualified immunity. For the sake of simplicity, I refer to the
decision that affirms the district court as the plurality, to the opposing opinion as the dissent.
104 See id. at 37-40 (Bownes, J.) (arguing that the plurality was "finding ambiguity where there
is none").
105 The four opinions are: the Roberts district court in Roberts v. Rhode Island, 175 F. Supp. 2d
176 (D. R.I. 2000), the First Circuit's affirmation in Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107 (1st Cir.
2001), the panel opinion in Savard v. Rhode Island, 320 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2003) and the First Cir-
cuit's en banc ruling in Savard v. Rhode Island, 338 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2003) (en banc).
106 See, e.g., Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111 ("[W]e think that the Rhode Island policies fall on the
Swain side of the constitutional line.").
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government. The dissent by contrast disagreed, failing to see why a
case that was easily distinguishable for "law" purposes created confu-
sion under the "clearly established" perspective.
The conflict regarding "clearly established law" is further reflected
by two contrasting Tenth Circuit opinions. Currier v. Doran'7 pre-
sented a variation on the facts of the Supreme Court's holding in De-
Shaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services'08 In Currier, the state
removed a young Anthony Juarez from his mother's custody, and
awarded custody to Vargas, the boy's father. According to the allega-
tions, on more than six occasions, Defendant Doran, a state family
services employee, failed to properly investigate bruises and injuries
appearing on Anthony's body and ignored telltale signs of physical
abuse. Roughly one year after being placed in Vargas's custody, Var-
gas poured boiling water over the child, who died shortly thereafter.
A suit against the state for Fourteenth Amendment violations en-
sued. 109
The Supreme Court's DeShaney holding loomed large in Currier.
DeShaney famously considered the Fourteenth Amendment claims of
the young Joshua who was subjected to severe child abuse by his fa-
ther. Although officials had several opportunities to observe the
abuse firsthand, they took no action to remove Joshua from his fa-
ther's custody.11 The Court rejected Joshua's due process claim, find-
ing that a state had no affirmative duty to secure the life, liberty, or
property of its citizens when the deprivation was not caused by the
state. The Court justified its holdin , reasoning that the peril Joshua
faced was not a state-created danger.
Drawing on the negative inference of this language, Currier found
that the state could be liable for third-party torts if the state assisted
in creating the danger that caused the harm."2 Currier distinguished
DeShaney on the grounds that Joshua (DeShaney plaintiff) was re-
107 242 F.3d 905 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that defendant, Medina, a state social worker, was
entitled to qualified immunity since there was no clearly established law regarding her behav-
ior).
108 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that the state had no duty under the Constitution to protect
a child from his father following the receipt of reports of possible abuse).
109 Currier, 242 F.3d at 909-10.
Ito DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193-94.
H Id. at 201 ("[The state] played no part [in its] creation, nor did it do anything to render
him any more vulnerable to them.... [The state] placed him in no worse position than that in
which he would have been had it not acted at all.").
112 Currier, 242 F.3d at 917-18 ("[S]tate officials can be liable for the acts of third parties
where those officials 'created the danger' that caused the harm.") (quoting Seamons v. Snow,
84 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1996)). On the broader issue of governmental liability for third-
party torts, see McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 324 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (up-




turned to the same parent, making the child no worse off than if the
state had not acted. Anthony (Currier plaintiff), on the other hand,
was placed into the custody of a different parent."' Because Anthony
was placed in a worse position than he would have been in had the
state not intervened at all, the state was subject to liability.
Having established a constitutional violation, Currier turned to the
"clearly established" prong. The court retraced its steps, again find-
ing a state-created danger exception built into DeShaney. Even
though Currier reached the opposite conclusion from DeShaney, De-
Shaney clearly established the constitutional violation at issue in Cur-
rier. Currier holds that even under the "clearly established law" prong,
government defendants are charged not only with knowing De-
Shaney's positive holding, but with drawing out the le al implications
"embedded" within the precedent court's reasoning.
Currier's image of immunity lies in sharp contrast with Herring v.
Keenan,' 5 another Tenth Circuit decision decided less than a year ear-
lier. In Herring, the court found that probation officer Keenan vio-
lated probationer Herring's rights when she disclosed his HIV-
positive status to his employer. In the ensuing suit, the court found a
constitutional right of privacy to personal medical information.
6
Specifically, the court relied on A.L.A. v. West Valley " a case de-
cided after the events giving rise to Herring's action. A.L.A. held that
police officers may not disclose the results of an arrestee's HIV test,
concluding that, "there is no dispute that confidential medical in-




After finding the constitutional violation, the court turned to
qualified immunity. Since A.L.A. was decided after the events in Her-
ring, the case was deemed out-of-bounds for qualified immunity pur-
poses."9 Looking primarily to the Supreme Court's holding in Griffin
v. Wisconsin,2 the court granted Keenan qualified immunity. Griffin
distinguished between the Fourth Amendment rights of regular citi-
13 See Currier, 242 F.3d at 918 ("In this case, Anthony and Latasha were removed from their
mother and placed with their father. In DeShaney,Joshua was removed from his father and then
returned to his father.").
11 See id. at 923 (concluding that a reasonable officer would have known and understood the
DeShaney holding).
15 218 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2000). A critique of Herring can be found at Colin Barnacle, The
Missing Voice of Herring v. Keenan: The Narrowing of the Tenth Circuit's Qualified Immunity Analysis,
78 DENV. U. L. REv. 283 (2000) (critiquing Herring on the basis of both Supreme Court and in-
tra-circuit precedents).
16 Herring, 218 F.3d at 1175.
117 26 F.3d 989, 990-91 (10th Cir. 1994), cited in Herring, 218 F.3d at 1175.
18 Id. at 990.
119 See Herring, 218 F.3d at 1176 n.4 (dismissing Plaintiffs argument that A.L.A. demonstrated
a right to privacy vis a vis HIV status).
10 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
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zens and rights granted to probationers. Since supervision of proba-
tioners was a "special need" of the state, the Court "permit[ted] a de-
gree of impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if
applied to the public at large.,12 Herring, in turn, reasoned that since
Griffin held that a probationer's rights were limited, and because nei-
ther the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit provided further
guidance on the matter, a reasonable probation officer would be ex-
cused from knowing that the disclosure of a probationer's HIV status
violated the Constitution. 122
Judge Seymour dissented, finding that "the majority extrapolates
from the [Supreme] Court's naked holding without ever acknowledg-
ing the underlying analysis and reasoning, and fails entirely to apply
that analysis and reasoning to the facts of this case.' 23 Judge Seymour
charged the majority with ignoring the fact that Griffin's justification
rested on the special needs of the probation system which legitimates
the reduced privacy rights of probationers. Griffin struck a balance
between probationers' privacy interests and government "interests in
reducing recidivism and ensuring that the community is not harmed
by the probationer's being at large., 124 This balancing would turn out
quite differently in Herring since Keenan's disclosure served no le-
gitimate government interest.
B. Legal Interpretation at Common Law
2
1
The interpretive method employed in federal tort cases (and
common law judging, more generally) exhibits three related tenden-
cies. First, "legal rules" are nothing more than the abstracted form in
121 Id. at 875.
1 See Herring, 218 F.3d at 1176.
123 Id. at 1182.
124 Id. at 1181.
125 The description in this section is culled from a number of different writers including:
MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAw (1988); FULLER, supra note 49;
EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING, (1968); FREDERICK SCHAUER,
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN
LAW AND IN LIFE 167-206 (2002); A.W.B. SIMPSON, Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL
THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE COMMON LAW (1987); LLOYD WEINREB, LEGAL
REASON (2005); James Gordley, Legal Reasoning: An Introduction, 72 CAL. L. REV. 138 (1984);
S.F.C. Milsom, Law and Fact in Legal Development, 17 U. TORONTO LJ. 1 (1967); S.F.C. Milsom,
Reason in the Development of the Common Law, 81 L.Q. REV. 496 (1965); Frederick Schauer, Is the
Common Law Law?, 77 CAL. L. REV. 455 (1989) (reviewing MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF
THE COMMON LAW (1988)) [hereinafter Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?]; Frederick Schauer,
Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987) [hereinafter Schauer, Precedent]; Cass R. Sunstein, On
Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARv. L. REV. 741 (1993). There are, of course, important differences
between the accounts of the common law presented by each of these scholars that are not re-
flected in the material. I have tried to stay within the points of consensus, and do not find the
disagreement between these theorists to be material to the points made in text.
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which a downstream court expresses the holdings of a precedent
court. These rules do not have a canonical form and are formulated
by the deciding, rather than the precedent court.126 Second, the rules
themselves are subject to modification at the moment of application.
A court applying a common law rule can propose a distinction or re-
finement of the rule (understood to be consistent with the rule) to
explain why the rule should be applied in a modified version in light
of the facts at bar. Third, the primary significance of a common law
precedent lies in the reasoning and analysis used by the precedent
setting court in reaching its conclusion. Frequently, courts find
themselves bound more by the precedent court's reasoning than by
its bottom-line holding. 127 The lawyer's skill lies in the ability to read
a body of decided cases, ferret out the underlying reasoning, extract
the operative rule, and then apply the holdings/rules to emerging
factual circumstances.
These features are integrally connected. Because the law is not
posited by a governing body but is developed by judges over time,
rules often start out as generalized holdings and become more speci-
fied and localized over time. The rule's origin as a case holding-
along with the lack of a binding and canonical text-means that the
precedential case-with all its contextual idiosyncrasies-can be revis-
ited by a downstream court. Secondly, because the rule can be
"pierced" by examining its factual predicates, common law rules are
subject to subtle modification, expansion, or contraction at the mo-
ment of application. Third, because the law arises from decided
cases, the legal regime is not developed through a ra-
tional/hierarchical delineation of all the legal rules that are needed
to effectively govern any given area of the law. Quite to the contrary,
published opinions only come about once a client decides to seek le-
gal counsel, the lawyer deems the case worthy, the parties find it un-
wise to settle, and the losing party undertakes the expense of appeal.
While the merits of this system can be and have often been debated,
this adjudicative method is unlikely to produce a comprehensive cata-
126 Schauer, Precedent, supra note 125.
127 A good demonstration of this common law feature was displayed in an argument between
Judges Posner and Easterbrook in United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004). Booker
presented the question of whether the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.
Ct. 2531 (2004), which found the State of Washington's sentencing guidelines unconstitutional,
applied to the federal guidelines scheme. Judge Posner's majority opinion found the federal
guidelines unconstitutional because the reasoning in Blakely "casts a long shadow" on the fed-
eral guidelines. Id. at 510. Judge Easterbrook dissented, arguing that it is not the job of the
court of appeals to apply Supreme Court holdings to alternate circumstances, especially when
the Supreme Court itself withheld judgment on the issue. Id. at 516 (Easterbrook, J., dissent-
ing). While Posner favored reasoning over its stated holding, Easterbrook held that since the
Court specifically limited its holding to the Washington state sentencing regime, the court of
appeals had no business invalidating the guidelines.
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logue of legal rights and duties along the lines of a bureaucratically
enacted code. Rather, the system nearly guarantees that legal doc-
trine will be haphazard and incomplete, while relying substantially on
the court's ability to infer future holdings from within existing case
law.128
In a more general sense, the viability of this mode of adjudication
depends on being able to hold together the idea that the law is both a
coherent and predictable set of rules, as well as an organism that can
react and adapt to new situations-typically by offering new interpre-
tations of existing texts. In easy cases (where the precedent points
the way of the desired social outcome), the precedent/rule is cleanly
applied to the new set of facts. 2 9 However, when the result dictated
by precedent is in tension with the desired social outcome, the law
employs a variety of methods to modify the rule's application and
reach the desired result. These techniques include introducing rea-
soning from an alternate case or line of cases, pointing to some in-
consistency within the line of precedent, and restricting the prece-
dential reach (or shadow) of a case by limiting its holding to specific
facts. The deciding court reaches back into the morass of legal mate-
rials that established the rule and reformulates the rule in light of
emerging facts.' By casting legal development in archeological
terms of "rediscovering" the tradition, the law is able to maintain the
appearance of being both consistent and adaptive.
This method, ably displayed by Herring, Savard, and Currier, dove-
tails with the conception of the law where the law is bound together
by an underlying conceptual substructure of legal doctrine, or what
we might term "Law.0 3  Reported cases are evidence of the Law-
gateways to understanding the underlying doctrine. It is this latent
layer that legitimizes the common law's regenerative powers, because
it holds that "new" distinctions are not new, but are discovered from
within the latticework of existing legal rules. The lawyer's skill lies in
the ability to understand the contours of the Law from within the
body of reported case law. Under this system, there is no need for a
set of preordained legal rules because new rules can be crafted out of
128 See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (providing an empirical analysis of which cases are litigated and ap-
pealed).
29 This description is taken from EISENBERG, supra note 125, at 50. While Schauer, in Is the
Common Law Law?, supra note 125, contends that doctrine and precedent exerts more pull on
common law decisions than Eisenberg allows, their difference is one of degree not kind.
,ao For a typical illustration of this technique, see Rector v. City and County of Denver, 348 F.3d
935, 944 (10th Cir. 2003), which disposed of a central issue in the case by discovery of a princi-
ple lurking between two Supreme Court cases decided in the 1970s.
13 See supra Part II.A. (describing in detail the analyses in Herring, Savard, and Currier).
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the body of latent principles at the moment of application. The Law,
thus, develops case-by-case, addressing new issues as they arise.
While all this sounds hopelessly out of date as a matter of theory, it
has surprising resonance in practice. Lawyers use case law as evidence
of trends or approaches used by other tribunals faced with similar
facts. When counsel proposes a theory to distinguish between various
lines of precedent, he or she is arguing that under a correct reading
of the Law the case should be decided in favor of his client. This new
theory or proposed distinction, which may at first blush conflict with
the decided law, is legitimate because it is drawn out from the Law's
latent substructure. Even today, lawyers make frequent reference to
the legal principles lurking beneath decided case law, and argue that
cases fit a coherent conceptual structure. While this is not the place
to speculate on why the common law practice remains intact despite
the rejection of its predicate theory, it is worth noting that cases are
still largely decided through an inductive analytical process of, and
abstraction from, decided case law.
Even this rather thin description of the common law's operation
demonstrates the inherent tension between common law adjudica-
tion and the code-inspired model favored by "clearly established"
doctrine. Codes are introduced to put an end to the meandering,
case-by-case progression of the common law. While in practice codes
raise difficult questions of construction and interpretation, in their
ideal form, they reflect a decision to replace judicial analytics with
legislative fiat. Common law precedent, by contrast, is typically only
the starting point of legal analysis. In addition to the precedent's
strict "holding," the style, structure, tone, and reasoning of prior
cases play an important role in determining its interpretation by
downstream courts. Since these less-than-fully articulated signals ex-
ert a pull on the bottom-line outcome, the case's holding cannot
simply be reduced to a code-like rule.
Because cases are designed to be the starting point of applying the
law to a new set of facts, unlike codified schemes, they do not (even
attempt to) contain a comprehensive and conclusive presentation of
the relevant doctrine. It is therefore difficult to predict future deci-
sions without reading the case law and analyzing it in the common
law method. This is the central problem of clearly established analy-
sis. The body of law comprising constitutional tort doctrine is written
in the traditional mode and must be interpreted in that same mode.
The "clearly established" doctrine, however, asks courts to read these
cases like codes, focusing on a bumper-sticker-like "rule" rather than
the cases' broader context and analytic method. When these tradi-
tions are ignored, the seams that hold the law together begin to un-
ravel. Thus, despite more than a generation of experience with
qualified immunity, the Supreme Court and lower courts remain in-
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herently uncertain about how to distinguish between clearly estab-
lished and regular precedents.
The conceptual tension has resulted in courts adopting two com-
peting approaches. Some courts collapse the distinction between the
132two Saucier inquiries, treating the clearly established doctrine as a
reprise of the traditional legal inquiry. Other courts treat the lack of
positive statements as evidence that the law is not clearly established,
and grant defendants immunity unless the plaintiff has the fortitude
to find a case with remarkably similar facts. Neither of these re-
sponses is satisfactory.
C. Text and Context
The theoretical comments in Part II.B. are borne out by recent
case law. Take for example, Currier' s treatment of DeShaney. M Judg-
ing ex ante, Currier is exactly the case DeShaney was intended to cover.
DeShaney taught that state social workers are not liable for the con-
duct of abusive parents, if the child would have been in the abusive
parent's custody had the state not intervened. 13 5  While DeShaney
seemed squarely on point, 1 6 Currier held, however, that as applied to
its facts, DeShaney supported liability-a classic demonstration of a rule
being modified at the moment of application. 137
Currier was able to distinguish DeShaney because it looked behind
the blackletter rule and analyzed the holding in light of its predicate
facts. This approach exhibits several of the common law's interpre-
tive features. First, because the rule is really a case-holding, it can be
"pierced," meaning the downstream court can look to the facts be-
132 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (asking: first, whether a constitutional violation
been alleged and second, whether the law was "clearly established").
See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text (discussing Cunrier's analysis of a state's pos-
sible liability for third party torts).
13 See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text (discussing Currier's application of DeShaney
to find that the latter clearly established the constitutional violation at-issue).
135 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
136 Currieds analysis is all the more surprising because DeShaney has come to stand for the
principle that the government is not liable for third-party actions in a wide range of areas. See,
e.g., Bright v. Westmoreland County, 380 F.3d 729 (3d Cir. 2004) (showing that police failure to
arrest the perpetrator of a crime is actionable); Hall v. Feigan, 104 Fed. Appx. 247 (3d Cir.
2004) (showing that a liability suit against an FBI agent who revealed the identity of a police
informant resulting in the informant's murder is actionable); Tuffendsam v. Dearborn County
Bd. of Health, 385 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 2004) (showing that the city's failure to call attention to a
sewage problem is actionable); Cartwright v. Marine City, 336 F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing
DeShaney to decide whether police failure to prevent Plaintiff from being hit by a car is action-
able); Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F.3d 409 (3d Cir. 2003) (showing that police failure
to respond to a 911 call is actionable). Currier's reading is all the more ambitious in light of the
extreme similarity between the facts of Currier and DeShaney.
137 See Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 923 (10th Cir. 2001) ("[In DeShaney] the court was
careful to note ... that the state had played no part in creating the danger . ").
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hind the rule and tailor its application accordingly. Second, DeShaney
was modified at the moment of application, as the state-created dan-
ger exception was, at best, left undecided by the original holding.
138
Lastly, Currier reflected the triumph of the case's reasoning over its
holding. Whereas DeShaney denied governmental liability, Currier re-
lied on it to support liability for the defendant government officials.
First-year students quickly learn that it is usually unclear how many
of a case's facts are necessary to its holding. The law professor's bat-
tery of questions demonstrates the difficulty of placing prudential
limitations on a complex holding such as DeShaney. While Currier's
analysis represents a possible interpretation of DeShaney's operative
principles, it is far from unassailable. Restated in qualified immunity
terms, Currier is a good candidate for the "law," but a stretch for
"clearly established law." But while this approach demonstrates sensi-
tivity to the texture of the common law method, it fails to provide any
analytical coherence to the distinction between "law" and "clearly es-
tablished law."
Herring reflects the opposite viewpoint. 139 There, the court found
that the clearly established inquiry demanded suspension of the
common law process. Rather than deriving the law from relevant
precedents, Herring maintained that the law must resemble a code
where each fact must be unambiguously accounted for in the given
rule. While common law reasoning may create law, these open-
ended interpretive techniques cannot "clearly" establish law. For this
reason, Herring analyzed Griffin as a one-dimensional, seemingly codi-
fied, statement of law which broadly determined that probationers
have reduced privacy rights and deprived Griffin of any meaningful
context through which to examine its factual or prudential under-
pinnings. Using only the blunt tools of clearly established analysis,
the Court could not differentiate between the "special needs" of the
probation system that justify a warrantless search, and the disclosure
of a probationer's medical status that is unrelated to legitimate state
138 See, e.g., McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per cu-
riam) (upholding, via a divided Fifth Circuit, the viability of the "state-created danger" theory of
liability).
IN See supra text accompanying notes 115-24 (giving a detailed account of the court's Herring
analysis). The structural similarity between Herring and Currier is quite striking. In both cases,
the Tenth Circuit was faced with relevant Supreme Court precedent denying relief. Both Su-
preme Court precedents, however, hinted at prudential limits on their respective doctrines of
non-liability; DeShaney suggested that certain scenarios may support government liability, and
Griffin indicated that the limitations on probationers' rights were circumscribed by substantive
constraints. See supra text accompanying notes 120-24 (describing the Herring court's reliance
on the Griffin holding). The central difference was the relative weight the Tenth Circuit placed
on the Court's reasoning as opposed to its holding.
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interests. 40 In Herring, clearly established law evokes an image of an
unambiguous code. If a rule needs to be "pierced" to examine its
original context, or if the court must consider the limitations and ex-
ceptions attending to the rule, the rule cannot be clearly established.
Judge Seymour's dissent accurately points to the structural limita-
tions of the majority's approach. The dissent argues that Griffin is a
common law holding whose downstream application must be guided
by the facts of the case and the reasoning employed by the court.
141
Since Griffin was decided in the context of a search of a probationer's
home for contraband in violation of the terms of probation, it cannot
be blindly applied to the substantially different facts in Herring. To
the contrary, Griffin's exception for the "special needs" of the proba-
tion system would seem to support liability in Herring where the gov-
ernment had no legitimate "special needs" claim. Like Currier, Sey-
mour's dissent ties the application of the Griffin rule to the facts of
that case. When viewed and interpreted in the appropriate context,
Griffin supports (rather than forecloses) finding that plaintiff Her-
ring's privacy rights were clearly established.'
42
The debate in Herring touches on the same issue that divided the
Supreme Court in Wilson.143 Both the Herring and Wilson majorities
conceptualized the announced rule as creating a novel doctrinal re-
finement of the law---one that officers were not charged with predict-
ing. Conversely, Justice Stevens and Judge Seymour viewed the de-
fendants as looking for an unwarranted exception to the
longstanding rule. Stevens and Seymour view the rules from the com-
mon law perspective and deny qualified immunity because the cor-
rect outcome involved an ordinary application of relevant prece-
dents. The Wilson and Herring majorities, however, took a more
limited view of existing case law. By limiting each precedent to its
most restricted blackletter holding, these majorities highlighted the
analytic gap stretching from one case to another. As a result, each
case seems far removed from its precedent and leaves the jurist with
the overall impression that the law is not clearly established.
140 See Herring, 218 F.3d at 1176-77 (finding that the "special needs" at play in Griffin were
distinguishable from the facts of the case at hand).
141 See id. at 1181 (Seymour, J., dissenting) (arguing that the requirement of "an exacting fac-
tual similarity between prior cases at bar" is inappropriate).
142 See id. at 1181-82 (Seymour, J., dissenting) (arguing that Griffin supports a finding that "a
probationer has a constitutional right to privacy").
143 See supra text accompanying notes 40-46 (offering a detailed account of the facts and rea-
soning in Wilson); see also supra Part I.B. (discussing in detail the problem of articulating the
difference between law and clearly established law).
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The First Circuit's experience with Savard/Roberts144 suggests a
similar set of analytical difficulties. When viewed from the ordinary
perspective of "law," the First Circuit, en banc, agreed that Roberts was
decidedly on the Swain-side of the Arruda/Swain line. However, when
it came to the clearly established analysis, the court dead-ended in a
four-four split. The plurality's view of clearly established analysis re-
quires courts to severely limit the scope of permitted analogies and
legal inferences. Under this artificial form of legal analysis, the entire
space between Arruda and Swain merges into an undifferentiated
"gray area" with little room for refined analytic distinctions. 145 Cases
within this area are not clearly established.
This analysis asks the court to don analytical blinders that make
easy distinctions appear uncertain, and simple analogies seem far-
fetched. Blinders firmly in place, the court surveys the legal land-
scape, only to find it confusing and inconclusive, or not clearly estab-
lished. Under this methodology, a colorable immunity claim will
almost always be available. But if potential, albeit rejected, arguments
can throw the system into disarray, there seems to be no limit to the
number of inferences, rejected theories, and plausible, if losing, ar-
guments, that will bar a court from declaring the law clearly estab-
lished.
1 46
At a higher level of generality, the legal landscape is only naviga-
ble by means of distinctions that give order to the near-endless con-
stellations of divergent doctrines and facts. 147 The more sophisticated
the legal system, the greater the number and subtlety of its distinc-
tions. While there will always be disagreement at the margins, a func-
tioning system succeeds in sorting the majority of legal questions into
the correct analytical box with reasonable consistency. Herein lays
the danger of the Savard-majority model. The realm of constitutional
tort law must be comprehensive enough to account for a wide variety
144 See supra text accompanying notes 76-106 (discussing the Savard issue of whether Roberts
was "clearly established").
145 Id.
146 It is important to distinguish the tension caused by the mismatch of the common law and
clearly established methods from the general critiques of law and legal determinacy. The
"clearly established" doctrine only plays an active role in cases where the "legal" question, find-
ing a constitutional violation, has been answered decidedly for the plaintiff. Thus, from the
perspective of the general indeterminacy critiques, the legal decision is uncontroversial, or what
Schauer would term an "easy case." See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399,
406 (1985) [hereinafter Schauer, Easy Cases]. Rather, in these qualified immunity cases, the
difficulties stem from abandoning the traditional modes of interpretation.
147 See Pierre Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction, 40
STAN. L. REV. 929, 935 (1988) ("If the splits can arrange and rearrange themselves without rea-
son and in no apparent order.... [i]t becomes exceedingly difficult to give a rational account
of the legal enterprise. And it becomes very difficult to give an account of the legal enterprise
in which reason plays a leading role.").
148 See Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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of factual and doctrinal nuances and order is maintained only by sub-
tle distinctions. Savard's idea of clearly established law dumbs down
the legal analysis until only the most basic and obvious distinctions
are recognized. From this "blind" perspective, the law will invariably
look jumbled and disorganized-anything but clearly established.
The problem with the "clearly established code" model is that it
takes a legal text produced by a particular tradition, written and in-
terpreted within that tradition, and subjects it to a foreign set of in-
terpretive assumptions. Because the common law assumes that its
holdings will be analyzed and applied through reference to its tradi-
tional techniques of legal reasoning, legal rules are presented within
their factual context, and doctrinal ambiguities remain unresolved.1 49
Further, since the primary use of a common law precedent is as an
analytic guide for future decisions, the constitutional tort regime sys-
tematically fails to produce results that satisfy "clearly established"
standards.
It is important to realize that these proclivities run deep within
our interpretive traditions. At their core, common law courts are de-
ciders of cases, not expositors of doctrine. 15° Extensions of the opera-
tive rules are left to future cases and the law is content to leave issues
undecided until the question is directly put to the court. Moreover a
court's experiment to venture out and decide more than it was asked
is viewed with skepticism and derided as obiter dicta.15' Rather than
attempting to be the final word on the matter, the common law opin-
ion understands that it is but a link in the evolving chain of common
law revelation.'52 While this system may work well for context-sensitive
149 See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996) (ex-
ploring the uses of minimalism by the Supreme Court and the circumstances under which such
use is warranted); see also Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997 (1994)
(focusing on the implications of Article III for resolving how federal courts should distinguish
between dicta and holdings of past cases).
150 Cass Sunstein calls this judicial minimalism. See Sunstein, supra note 149, at 6-7 (describ-
ing "leaving as much as possible undecided.., as 'decisional minimalism'").
151 See, e.g., Ala. State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945) (noting that the
standards for ajusticiable case or controversy are strict).
152 This is not to suggest that the common law contains no blackletter principles, as it surely
does. Every area of the law, constitutional torts included, has known legal principles. See, e.g.,
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (explaining that qualified immunity has two compo-
nents which should be considered in a particular order); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
638 (1987) (stating that all government agents are entitled to raise a defense of qualified im-
munity); Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1055 n.3 (9th Cir.
2003) (stating that a municipality may not raise a claim of qualified immunity). It is important
to recognize, however, that what makes a rule "blackletter law" is that it is consistently applied
across a wide variety of factual scenarios. The nature of tort liability (including constitutional
torts), on the other hand, is that the legal determinations are highly fact-specific, and that,
other than at the margins, few blackletter rules exist. Therefore, the rules in this area are open-
textured and are applied only through contextual legal analysis.
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development of legal doctrine, it has difficulty producing "clearly es-
tablished law."
III. MULTI-VARIABLE LEGAL CALCULUS
The previous section looked at the "clearly established" doctrine
within the context of the standard tale of common law development
and adjudication. This is the "rule-refinement" model. However,
there is another model of development in which the rules are not
continually refined called "general standard" cases. While scholars
have not generally distinguished between these two forms of legal
analysis, these cases present important differences when assessing the
interaction between common law legal reasoning and the clearly es-
tablished mandate.
5 3
A. What Is the General Standard and When Does It Appear.?
54
The most familiar general standard is the reasonableness standard
in tort law. Here, the "legal" question is little more than an evaluative
inquiry into the facts of the case. The question is whether, consider-
153 While these categories are not airtight, it is worth noting how these two modes of legal
reasoning are affected by the qualified immunity doctrine.
154 The classic demonstration of the tension between rule-refinement and general standard
regimes is the contrast between Justice Holmes's opinion in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v.
Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927), which favored rules for recurring negligence situations, and Jus-
tice Cardozo's opinion in Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co., 292 U.S. 98, 104 (1934), which argued
that since rules "declared at times by courts" are "taken over from the facts of life," the proper
standard of care must be determined in light of the facts of each case. In the context of prob-
able cause standards, the Supreme Court has stated in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690
(1996):
Articulating precisely what "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause" mean is not pos-
sible. They are commonsense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act. As such, the standards are not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a
neat set of legal rules. We have described reasonable suspicion simply as a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity, and probable
cause to search as existing where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to
warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found. We have cautioned that these two legal principles are not finely-
tuned standards, comparable to the standards of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence. They are instead fluid concepts that take
their substantive content from the particular contexts in which the standards are being
assessed .... This Court has a long-established recognition that standards of reason-
ableness under the Fourth Amendment are not susceptible of Procrustean application;
each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.
Id. at 695-96 (internal brackets, citations and quotation marks omitted).
An early attempt to explain how normative questions embedded in the general standard
cases should be analyzed in qualified immunity cases can be found at Henk J. Brands, Note,
Qualified Immunity and the Allocation of Decision-Making Functions Between Judge and Jury, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1045 (1990).
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ing all the circumstances, the defendant's conduct was reasonable. 5
Detailed factual review, however, comes at the expense of predictabil-
ity. Totality of the circumstances tests are thus best suited to cases in
which the legal outcome depends on a wide variety of facts-where
the law cannot be usefully reduced into a more definite "legal rule."
Put differently, the facts and law converge, and the decision-maker
must evaluate the facts in light of the remote legal standard. Even
Justice Scalia, the Court's most ardent supporter of clear rules, finds
that these cases must be decided under general standards since "we
have passed the point where 'law' properly speaking has any further
application. 1 6 In Justice Scalia's view, the lack of meaningful "legal"
issues in these cases is the very reason why the Supreme Court should
deny certiorari in most general standard situations. 
157
Because identifying the correct legal rule is rarely difficult, gen-
eral standard cases focus on the application of a legal standard to
particular facts. 158 Since the standard must be calibrated to the spe-
cific facts of the case, the court must bridge the gap between the lofty
legal ideal-e.g., due process-and a specific act of governmental
deprivation. While this process adds little in the way of "law," it has
grave implications for the way the general standard is administered.
The open-ended nature of the inquiry means that fact appraisal
and value judgment play greater roles in the court's decision than
technical doctrinal analysis.1 9 General standards specifically invite so-
cial and communal values to assist the court in translating the ab-
stracted standard to the specific facts of the case. Commercial norms
l5 See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1187, 1188 (2001)
(describing the continuation of this trend, in the centrality of the negligence standard, in cur-
rent tort law); James Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law,
51 IND. L.J. 467, 525 (1976) (noting a trend whereby almost all tort cases are decided under a
totality of the circumstances/negligence standard); see also EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 77, 244-90 (2003) (analyzing the "unexpected persistence
of negligence").
156 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1182 (1989); see
also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 703 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The facts of this
case illustrate the futility of attempting to craft useful precedent from the fact-intensive review
demanded by determinations of possible cause and reasonable suspicion.").
157 Scalia, supra note 156, at 1187 (arguing that, where possible, the court should avoid mak-
ing decisions that do not reflect a general rule).
158 For an example, consider Justice Kennedy's description in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
205 (2001):
It is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here
excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts. An officer might
correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have a mistaken understanding as to
whether a particular amount of force is legal in those circumstances.
Id.
159 See generally Stephen Weiner, The CivilJury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REV.




become relevant to contract cases,'16 professional or social standards
assist in determining the appropriate duty of care in tort,16 and po-
lice officers' experience are relevant to determinations of probable
cause. 6' The communal voice, the voice from "outside" the law per-
forms the translating function abdicated by the general standard.'
The viability of this analytical structure depends on the ability to
mediate the gap between general concepts (due process, excessive
force, and unreasonable search) and the specific interactions be-
tween law enforcement and individual citizens. Since the general le-
gal standard is a fact-based value judgment, the standard must be in-
terpreted through positive law, communal or industry standards, and
160 Id. at 1895-96 ("Indeed, courts have made many of the same observations with respect to
the concept of reasonableness in this context as they have in the negligence sphere.").
161 Id. at 1876-77 (discussing the application of the reasonableness standard in various
fields); see also Abraham, supra note 156, at 1201 ("[T]he finder of fact is encouraged or re-
quired to apply an independent norm that has developed through either experience (custom
and professional standards) or legal authority (statutes).").
162 See generally cases collected in Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment, in 2 WEST'S CRIMINAL PRACTICE SERIES § 3.2(c) (4th ed. 2004) (noting that the ex-
perience of the police officer is relevant to the determination of probable cause).
163 Interestingly, in the analogous habeas corpus context, the Supreme Court has noted the
tension between general standards and the requirement for clearly established precedents. See
Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992) (discussing whether a lower court had properly applied a
standard to determine whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction). In his
Wright concurrence, justice Kennedy wrote:
Whether the prisoner seeks the application of an old rnle in a novel setting depends in
large part on the nature of the rule. If the rule in question is one which of necessity re-
quires case-by-case examination of the evidence, then we can tolerate a number of spe-
cific applications without saying that those applications themselves create a new
rule.... By its very terms the [sufficiency of the evidence standard in Jackson v. Virginia]
provides a general standard which calls for some examination of the facts... So of
course there will be variations from case to case. Where the beginning point is a rule of
this general application, a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad
of factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges
a new rule, one not dictated by precedent.
Id. at 308-09 (KennedyJ, concurring) (internal citations omitted).
More recently, commentators have argued that in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the
entire court adopted the Kennedy view and held that that mixed questions of law and fact do
not create a "new rule" for habeas purposes. See RANDY HERTZ & JAMES LIEBMAN, 2 FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1101-04 (2001). In the immunity context, however,
the Court has given no indication that it appreciates the scope of this problem, and, in fact, it
was Justice Kennedy who authored Saucier. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65 (discussing
the Saucier determination that an immunity analysis should be kept separate from the underly-
ing substantive rule). The Court's most recent exposition of the immunity standard continues
this trend, as only Justice Stevens seems to have grappled with this problem in his Brosseau dis-
sent. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 125 S. Ct. 596, 603 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that a
general legal rule that applies fact-specific case-by-case analysis is still clearly established for
qualified immunity purposes). Perhaps further inquiry would reveal why the Court takes such
divergent views in the immunity and habeas context.
Oct. 20051
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
intuitional/moral reasoning. In short, the domain of the law is
nearly unlimited.'
64
But, it is precisely this type of free-formed inquiry that the "clearly
established" test seeks to eliminate. "[T] hat we are morally outraged,
or the fact that our collective conscience is shocked by the alleged
conduct does not mean necessarily that the officials should have real-
ized that it violated a constitutional right .... But without the
mediation techniques, what connects the legal ideal to real facts?
B. Exemplary Cases
Anderson v. Creighton16 6 held that the general Fourth Amendment
standards are not particular enough to generate clearly established
law, and that plaintiffs must support their claims with examples from
cases with more specific facts. Saucier v. Katz held the same with re-
spect to excessive force claims.1 67 More recently, in Robles v. Prince
George's County,16 the Fourth Circuit provided a further demonstra-
tion of the incompatibility of the general standards and clearly estab-
lished analysis.
The facts in Robles are quite astonishing. Responding to a late-
night disorderly conduct call, two Prince George's County ("PGC")
police officers arrested Robles for an outstanding traffic warrant
pending in neighboring Montgomery County. 169 The PGC officers
wanted to hand Robles over to officers in Montgomery County. Be-
cause formal custody transfers require cumbersome procedures, the
officers sought to make use of a more expedient "transfer" on county
lines. Unable to arrange such an exchange, the officers drove Robles
to a deserted parking lot in the neighboring county and tied him to a
metal pole. Before driving off, they left a note at Robles's feet stating
that there were outstanding warrants for his arrest in Montgomery
County. Thereafter, and without identifying themselves as either po-
lice officers or perpetrators, the arresting officers placed a call to the
164 Scholars have understood the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis as reflecting the view
that law is an "unlimited domain." Schauer, The Limited Domain of the Law, supra note 55, at
1910.
165 Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 430 (5th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted); see also Doe v. Louisiana, 2 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th Cir. 1993) (King, J.,
concurring) (noting in the course of granting qualified immunity that while "the actions [al-
leged in the complaint] are egregious, [it] does not mean that he has asserted the violation of a
federally protected right. . .
166 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
167 533 U.S. 194, 201-06 (2001).
168 302 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2002).
169 Id. at 267.
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Montgomery County police reporting that a man was tied to a pole in
an empty parking lot.
The Fourth Circuit was not amused by the officers' "Keystone
Kop" routine.17 ' The court had no trouble finding that the police be-
havior here was "not reasonably related"-indeed it was entirely unre-
lated-"to any legitimate law enforcement purpose," and that the of-
ficials' actions unambiguously violated Robles's due process rights. 72
With respect to qualified immunity, the court found that the PGC of-
ficers did not violate any "clearly established law," since according to
Anderson "a greater degree of specificity is required to overcome a de-
fense of qualified immunity.'
173
Even more recently, in Brosseau v. Haugen,17 4 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed this analytic approach. The plaintiff filed an excessive
force claim against Officer Brosseau for shooting him as he at-
tempted to flee the scene by car. 175 The Ninth Circuit denied the of-
ficer's qualified immunity motion, finding that the general standards
set forth in Graham v. Connor176 and Tennessee v. Garner 7  sufficiently
established the law in this case.' 78 The Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that in light of all the particular circumstances facing Officer
Brosseau at the scene, no cases clearly established the unconstitu-
tionality of her actions.
79
Cases share a common analytic feature. Qualified immunity was
granted because on the one hand, the operative general standard was
too vague to clearly establish rights in a particular case, while individ-
ual cases decided under the standard were deemed too fact specific
to clearly establish the law in a different set of circumstances. In Sau-
cier, the officer's use of excessive force was immunized simply because
he "did not know the full extent of the threat respondent posed or
how many other persons there might be who, in concert with re-
spondent, posed a [security] threat...."18 The mere assertion of in-
complete information prevented the law from being clearly estab-
lished (the Court seemed wholly disinterested in setting forth the
minimal duty incumbent upon the officer to ascertain the answers).
170 Id.
171 Id. at 271.
172 Id. at 269.
173 Id. at 270 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)).
174 125 S. Ct. 596 (2004). See detailed discussion of this case infra Part IV.B.
175 Id. at 597.
176 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
177 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
178 Brosseau, 125 S. Ct. at 598.
179 See id. at 600 (comparing various precedents to determine that, since "the result depends
very much on the facts of each case," the law regarding the Fourth Amendment in this context
is not "clearly established").
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 208 (2001).
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The Robles defendants similarly escaped liability, not because there
was some reasonable basis or legitimate (if misguided) governmental
purpose in their actions, but because they were lucky enough to find
that there were no cases on the books in which the right kind of pole
was used for the right amount of time.'8 '
Such results are almost guaranteed since, under the clearly estab-
lished inquiry courts are restricted from relying on the very devices
that make the general standard intelligible in light of the facts facing
the court. 1 2  By excluding communal and social norms, state laws,
and departmental regulations, courts invariably find that the general
standard cannot be translated toward the particular deprivation at is-
181 See Robles v. Prince George's County, 302 F.3d 262, 269 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002) (dismissing
the applicability of Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) in a short footnote). Of course, from the
defendant's perspective, the amount of time Robles was restrained was totally fortuitous.
182 Robles is by no means an isolated case, as the Federal Reporters are filled with similar ex-
amples. See, e.g., Willingham v. Loughnan, 261 F.3d 1178, 1187 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (finding that in
the context of a standard excessive force claim, "[a]lmost always, to establish the law clearly in
the context of the Fourth Amendment, a materially similar case must have already decided that
what the police officer was doing was unlawful"); Lassiter v. Ala. A.& M. Univ., 28 F.3d 1146,
1149 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (holding that immunity should be denied only for acts "so ob-
viously wrong, in the light of preexisting law, that only a plainly incompetent officer ... would
have done such a thing .... ). Later the Supreme Court would characterize Lassiter as a case
applying a "rigid gloss on the qualified immunity standard." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 &
n.9 (2002). See also Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403-04 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that al-
though it was unconstitutional for agents to search password-protected computer files based on
roommate's consent to search the computer which they shared, defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity since no in-circuit cases specifically prohibited this action and one out-of-
circuit district court case suggested that the action was constitutional); Jenkins by Hall v. Talla-
dega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 826 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997) ("In this circuit the law can be
'clearly established' for qualified immunity purposes only by decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, or the highest court of the state where the case
arose."); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 465 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Garwood,
J., joined by five other judges, dissenting in part) (stating that although a high school princi-
pal's inaction in regards to a teacher who sexually molested a student was "deplorable," at the
time it was not "clearly established.., that mere inaction on his part violated the United States
Constitution"); White v. Taylor, 959 F.2d 539, 544 (5th Cir. 1992) (granting qualified immunity
because a general standard did not clearly establish the law at the correct level of generality);
Marsh v. Arn, 937 F.2d 1056, 1067 (6th Cir. 1991) ("We recognize that there is no definitive
guide as to when a right is 'clearly established.'"); KH. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 849 (7th Cir.
1990) (finding that child welfare workers who placed a child with foster parents known to be
incompetent and dangerous could be subjected to a damages suit only if the "specific right as-
serted" was "either expressly established by, or clearly implicit by existing case law"). Additional
examples are collected in Linda Ross Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1467, 1518-19 (1996)(citing Soliday v. Miami County, 55 F.3d 1158, 1161 (6th Cir. 1995)
(granting doctor immunity for cremating a body before notifying relatives); Cameron v. Seitz,
38 F.3d 264, 267 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding that qualified immunity was available to an employer
who retaliated against an employee on account of her engagement to another man); Rich v.
Mayfield Heights, 955 F.2d 1092, 1093 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that officers did not violate
clearly established law by failing to cut down a prisoner hanging from ajail cell door); Hilliard
v. City and County of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding that although the
court was "appalled" by the officers' conduct, they did not violate a woman's constitutional
rights when they left her in a high crime district after arresting her and impounding her car).
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sue. 8 3 Moreover, courts have cautioned that moral outrage or even
plain common sense is no substitute for the clearly established analy-
184
sis; as one court recently stated, "'I know it when I see it' is not a
substitute for qualified immunity analysis."'1 85 By excluding the very
factors used to translate the general standard to a given set of facts, it
is nearly impossible to show how any action could become clearly es-
tablished under the general standard.
Robles's argument from judicial silence demonstrates a further in-
congruity. The "there-is-nothing-on-the-books-that-says-this-is-illegal"
line of argument seems to envision a codified system of constitutional
torts where the law is arranged rationally and hierarchically in a cata-
logued code. In this hypothetical system, the most obvious and egre-
gious violations receive prominent attention (thus defeating immu-
nity), while silence can be reasonably interpreted as official
1816ambivalence 6. However, the tradition of general standard litigation
rests on a very different set of premises."" The presence (or absence)
of an on-point decision carries little, if any, normative weight (in
terms of the importance of having an on-point decision on those par-
ticular facts). In a litigant-driven system, decisions on the books have
everything to do with the litigants' cost-benefit analysis and nothing
183 See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984) (holding that violation of state law or regu-
lation does not deprive an official of qualified immunity); Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 318-19
(3d Cir. 2001) (finding that a state statute cannot clearly establish a federal right for qualified
immunity purposes); Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1180 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
departmental policy prohibiting disclosure of personal information does not clearly establish
the right for immunity purposes). But see Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343
F.3d 1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that it was clearly established that compressing the
chest of a restrained plaintiff constituted excessive force because local newspapers had publicly
discussed cases of compression asphyxia and because the material was covered in officer train-
ing).
184 See Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 430 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that moral
outrage is an insufficient legal basis); see also Doe v. Louisiana 2 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th Cir. 1993)
(King, J., concurring) (noting, in the course of granting qualified immunity, "[t]hat the actions
[alleged in the complaint] are egregious [but this quality], however, does not mean that he has
asserted the violation of federally protected right").
185 Robles v. Prince George's County, 308 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2002) (Wilkinson, J., con-
curring in denial of rehearing en banc).
186 Judge Posner realized this tension quite some time ago. See KH. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846,
851 (7th Cir. 1990) ("It begins to seem as if to survive a motion to dismiss a suit on grounds of
immunity the plaintiff must be able to point to a previous case that differs only trivially from his
case. But this cannot be right. The easiest cases don't even arise."); see also Johnson v. New-
burgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 2001) ("To the extent that no case apply-
ing this right... has previously arisen in our circuit, we view this unremarkable absence as a
strong indication that the right to be free of excessive force is so well-recognized and widely ob-
served ... as to have eluded the necessity ofjudicial pronouncement.").
187 In fact, the tradition goes back to the very first treatise on torts. See FRANCIs HILLIARD,
THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS 81-83 (1859) (stating that action lies in tort even if
there is no precedent or writ authorizing such action because "torts are infinitely various not
limited or confined").
Oct. 2005) 1189
JOURNAL OF CONSTFIUTIONAL LA W
to do with the doctrinal importance of having a holding on a given
set of facts. 8 Given the lack of correlation between the community's
disapproval of particular conduct, and a judicial opinion stating as
much, arguments from judicial silence are wholly out of place.' 9
Under the Anderson/Saucier/Robles line of cases the "objective rea-
sonableness" test turns into a scavenger hunt for exactingly similar
case law, bearing little relationship to whether the conduct is actually
reasonable or not.'90 It imagines something like the tax code, or a
parodied form of legal positivism, where anything that cannot be
cited chapter and verse as illegal is presumed to be within the bounds
of the law. But a tort system, which invariably governs a near-infinite
number of potential interactions between parties cannot work this
way. The current doctrine fails because it ignores the interpretive
traditions on which constitutional tort law rests.
C. General Standards and Specific Facts
General standard precedents clash with qualified immunity at yet
another level. Immunity is intended to be a one-time reprieve. In
theory, if immunity is granted to the first set of defendants, the rule
becomes clearly established and further claims are rejected.'1 Ide-
ally, ongoing litigation creates an expanding set of clearly established
legal principles. Once the rule is clearly established, the defense
should no longer be available.
92
However, the relationship between rules of law and general stan-
dard case-precedents affords defendants successive rounds of immu-
nity. Since the general legal standard must remain broad enough to
188 See generally Priest & Klein, supra note 128 (presenting a model of litigation that explains
the contrast between litigated and settled disputes); Jonathan M. Freiman, The Problem of Quali-
fied Immunity: How Conflating Microeconomics and Law Subverts the Constitution, 34 IDAHO L. REV.
61 (1997) (discussing the litigation deterrents caused by the clearly established doctrine).
189 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have addressed this issue most directly. See McGreal v.
Ostrov, 368 F.3d 657, 683 (7th Cir. 2004) ("To demonstrate that the law was clearly established,
the plaintiff may point to closely analogous cases demonstrating that the conduct was unlawful
or demonstrate that the violation is so obvious that a reasonable actor would know that what he
is doing violates the Constitution."); Lee v. Gregory, 363 F.3d 931, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[Elven
if there is no closely analogous case law, a right can be clearly established on the basis of 'com-
mon sense.'" (quoting Giebel v. Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001)).
190 See Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004) ("Hope thus shifted the quali-
fied immunity analysis from a scavenger hunt for prior cases with precisely the same facts to-
ward the more relevant inquiry of whether the law put officials on fair notice that the described
conduct was unconstitutional.").
191 See, e.g., Savard v. Rhode Island, 338 F.3d 23, 33 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating that downstream
defendants will not be able to raise the same immunity claim because the decision of the im-
munity-granting court clearly established the law).
192 See id. (implying that, if the case-at-hand matched a rule from one of the raised prece-
dents, immunity would have been foreclosed).
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cover every factual scenario arising under its broad heading, succes-
sive rounds of litigation fail to refine or circumscribe the operative
principle.'
To show just how this process works, it is useful to compare the
general standard cases with rule-refinement cases. 94  For example,
Herring's holding95 has been rephrased as establishing a "constitu-
tionally protected right to confidentiality [that] extends to medical
information or records.' 9 6 Similarly, one court read Currier'97 for the
principle that the state assumes a duty of care when its agents affirma-
tively act to place a citizen in harm's way.'9 8
It is much more difficult however to rephrase the holdings or the
ratio of a general standard case. To take one recent example, a court
faced with two excessive force cases that pulled in opposite directions
characterized one case as:
[F]inding excessive force where the plaintiff was already handcuffed
when an officer slammed her head on the car,'99 and another as finding
[no excessive force] where an officer grabbed the plaintiff from behind
by the shoulder and wrist, threw him against a van three or four feet
away, kneed him in the back and pushed his head into the side of the
van, searched his groin area in an uncomfortable manner and hand-
cuffed him."'
Rather than expressing the law in terms of a rule that can be "clearly
established," these cases do little more than offer demonstrations of
how particular facts have been judged in light of the general stan-
193 This is not to deny that there are circumstances where successive applications of a general
standard steer the law in one direction, resulting in a sub-rule under the general standard. A
good example is whether, under the Fourth Amendment, a "reasonable person" would feel free
to terminate the encounter with police. Courts have interpreted "reasonable person" in a more
specific "legal" sense and have moved away from deciding these cases under a general standard.
See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991) (finding that a "reasonable person" sitting
on a bus would think that he could ignore two police officers questioning him about drug
transportation); United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding similarly with
respect to a person confined to a train roomette). But these cases seem to reflect the exception
rather than the rule.
194 See supra Part II.C. (discussing the rule-refinement approach as applied to Heing and Cur-
rier).
195 See Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2000) (granting immunity, even though
an unconstitutional violation of privacy occurred).
196 SeeState v. Russo, 790 A.2d 1132, 1147-48 (Conn. 2002) (citing Herring, 218 F.3d at 1175);
see also Livsey v. Salt Lake County, 275 F.3d 952, 956 (10th Cir. 2001) (describing Herringas find-
ing a "legitimate expectation of privacy in nondisclosure of HIV status").
197 242 F.3d 905 (10th Cir. 2001) (denying immunity because it had been clearly established
that government officials are liable when they contribute to the harm).
198 See Eckert v. Town of Silverthorne, 25 Fed. Appx. 679, 688 (10th Cir. 2001) (observing
exceptions to the general rule in cases where government official creates the danger of harm).
199 Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1094 (11th Cir. 2003) (summarizing with a parentheti-
cal the holding of Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1191, 1198-99 (2002)).
200 Id. (summarizing Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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dard. The precedents are adjudicative examples, not elaborations of
legal principle. While these cases offer useful advice as to how the
standard should be administered, they are unlikely to create binding
statements of "clearly established law."
This tension is demonstrated by contrasting rule refinement cases
with general standard precedents such as Saucier and Robles.2°'
Brosseau demonstrates that Saucier did not clearly establish any point
of law, but merely held that the law was not clearly established in a
particular set of circumstances.0 2 Plaintiff Robles's experience shows
the same is true of Hope. Even though the Supreme Court issued
Hope (which clearly established that prison guards could not handcuff
prisoners to a fence for punitive reasons) just a few weeks before
Robles was decided, Robles dismissed Hope in a brief footnote, finding
that the case "involved a much lengthier detention under painful and
dangerous conditions amounting to cruel and unusual punishment.
It is therefore not dispositive of this claim. 2 14 As a forward-looking
precedent, Robles is certain to suffer a similar fate. Any one of its spe-
cific facts can be used to support an argument that the law is not
clearly established in just a slightly different setting. Since each fact
plays a part in creating the constitutional violation, each can serve as
a legitimate basis for distinction by a downstream court.2 0 5
The general standard emerges because the multiplicity of poten-
tially relevant facts means that the legal standard cannot be effectively
reduced to a more refined or particularized rule of law. Cases are
decided in localized, fact-specific terms to ensure that the law retains
enough elasticity to cover potential factual permutations. This places
Plaintiffs in a double bind. By definition, no statement of law can be
specific enough to clearly establish a particular violation, yet general
enough to account for the diversity of factors relevant to the analysis.
But precedents decided under the general standard are unlikely to be
of much use either. They cover only a narrow set of circumstances
closely hewn to the basic case-facts. It is difficult to see how a down-
stream case will be controlled by a case whose holding must be stated
in terms of its facts-the long parentheticals used to describe general
standard cases. While the traditional mode of legal analysis allows
201 See supra text accompanying notes 180-81 (discussing the relationship between the facts
and reasoning in Saucier and Robles).
202 See Brosseau v. Haugen, 125 S. Ct. 596, 600 (2004) (discussing the vagueness of general
standards and the factual particulars of the case).
203 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), was published on June 27, 2002; Robles was published
on August 26, 2002.
04 Robles v. Prince George's County, 302 F.3d 262, 269 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002).
205 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (holding that general Fourth Amendment
standards are not particular enough to generate "clearly established law"); see also Meyer, supra
note 182, at 1509 (explaining that case law is often indeterminate in its level of generality).
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courts to look at several general standard cases to reconstruct a more
particular legal principle, this is exactly the type of analysis that the
"clearly established" rule seeks to limit.2 0 6  Official defendants are
granted nearly limitless opportunities to argue that the presence or
absence of a specific fact justifies the officer's interpretation of the
general standard as reasonable.2 7 When confronting this claim, the
court inevitably looks at the morass of general standard precedents
and has little choice but to determine that the law is not clearly estab-
lished .
The confluence of qualified immunity and the general standard
leads to a paradox.0 9 On one hand, the clearly established law re-
quires the general standard to be stated with sufficient particularity in
terms of the specific case facts. Yet the analytic and interpretive
structure of general standard precedents prevents courts from doing
exactly that. The law seems destined to remain at the level of ab-
stracted ideals, making it all too easy for officers to be granted im-
munity.
210
206 However, there are general-standard qualified immunity cases that engage in a fact-
specific common law styled analysis to overcome qualified immunity. See, e.g., Carr v. Castle, 337
F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 2003) (using common law styled case-to-case reasoning to decide
the qualified immunity claim); Holland ex rel. Overdorffv. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1195-97
(10th Cir. 2001) (using common sense moral reasoning to deny qualified immunity in an exces-
sive force claim). Nonetheless, this mode of analysis simply raises the question as to the analyti-
cal difference between the two prongs of immunity analysis.
207 See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-70 (4th Cir. 2002) (examining a wide array
of factors to determine that the defendant-officers' conduct was neither an unreasonable sei-
zure, nor constituted excessive force).
208 See, e.g., Savard v. Rhode Island, 338 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding that an
imprecise distinction between permissible and impermissible strip searches in prison justified a
grant of qualified immunity); Hudson v. Hall, 231 F.3d 1289, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000) ("Public
officials are not obligated to be creative or imaginative in drawing analogies from previously
decided cases.") (citations omitted). The idea is especially true when the inquiry is as heavily
fact-dependent as the "voluntariness" inquiry. See Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 318-21 (3d Cir.
2001) (explaining that the diversity of opinions regarding whether it was reasonable to disclose
a prisoner's medical information justified the grant of qualified immunity); see also Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (surveying case law on voluntariness of consent to
search, explaining that "none of [the prior decisions] turned on the presence or absence of a
single controlling criterion; each reflected a careful scrutiny of all surrounding circumstances").
But see, e.g., DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 979-80 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that, despite the
absence of case law discussing the use of pepper spray, "this issue can be decided based not
upon the specific characteristics of pepper spray but upon the requirement that an excessive
use of force 'occur maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm"').2090..
For a different perspective on the relationship between broad substantive standards and
the qualified immunity doctrine, see Chen, The Ultimate Standard, supra note 7 (arguing for a
rule-oriented scheme with a set of criteria for determining protection entitlement, rather than
the qualified immunity doctrine).
See Azeez v. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296, 1301 (7th Cir. 1986) (arguing that courts should not
use the general standard to "read the defense of immunity out of federal tort law by the facile
expedient of stating constitutional rights in the most general possible terms .... The right must
be sufficiently particularized to put potential defendants on notice"). There are, of course,
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IV. CONTINUING THE CONFUSION: HOPEAND BROSSEAU
When the Supreme Court decided Saucier in 2001, the line begin-
ning with Harlow, running through Anderson and Wilson, and termi-
nating with Saucier seemed firmly cemented. But only a year after
Saucier, the Court issued Hope v. Pelzer, which presents a very different
vision of qualified immunity. "'
A. Hope: The Interpretive Approach
Hope presented an inmate's allegations that, as punishment for a
prior altercation with prison guards, he was forced to spend seven
hours in the hot sun without a shirt while handcuffed to a hitching
post.22 During this time, he was given water only once or twice and
was not allowed any bathroom breaks. Plaintiff alleged that a guard
taunted him about his thirst, giving water to a dog and then spilling a
214cooler of water onto the ground.
While the Court of Appeals had little difficulty finding this con-
duct unconstitutional, defendants obtained immunity on the basis
that the law was not clearly established.2 5  The Supreme Court
216granted certiorari and reversed.
The most telling part of the Court's discussion focused on the
217precedential value of Ort v. White for qualified immunity purposes.
In Ort, prison officials denied an inmate water in order to coerce him
to perform his assigned farm duties. The practice was upheld based
on the distinction between punishment on the one hand, and "coer-
cive measures undertaken to obtain compliance with a reasonable
prison rule" to "maintain order and discipline" on the other.2 19 The
court found the water deprivation legitimate because its purpose was
many instances where courts find the official actions so reprehensible that immunity is denied
even in general standard cases. See Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused,
51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 641-43 (1998) (discussing a collection of such cases in the Eighth
Amendment context). Nevertheless, the current doctrine provides courts with the opportunity
to engage in Robles-styled analysis, as described supra Part III.B.
211 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) ("For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours
must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing vio-
lates that right.... [I] n the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.").
212 Id. at 733-35.
213 Id. at 735.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 736.
27 Id. at 743-44. See Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 326 (11th Cir. 1987) ("[T]here must be a
mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the
[C] onstitution that are of general application.").
28 Oft, 813 F. 2d at 321.
219 Id. at 325.
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to coerce the inmate to comply with prison regulations. 220  The key
analogy was to civil contempt: the court found that the plaintiff "es-
sentially had the keys to the water keg in his own pocket."
According to the Court of Appeals decision in Hope, Ort could not
clearly establish the law as applied to the facts of Hope.222 The Su-
preme Court disagreed, however, and provided a traditional, com-
mon law styled reading of the case. Despite the fact that Ort upheld
the coercive practice of denying water to the prisoner, based on Ort's
reasoning, the Supreme Court found the official's actions in Hope were
"clearly established" as unconstitutional. 2  Ort implied a "premise
[that] has clear applicability in this case. [Plaintiff] Hope was not re-
strained at the worksite until he was willing to return to work .... Ort
therefore gave fair warning to respondents that their conduct crossed
the line of what is constitutionally permissible.,
2 4
In Hope's reading of Ort, even under the "clearly established"
standard, reasoning triumphs over the naked holding. Even a case
with the opposite holding can provide the basis of "clearly established
law.' '225 This view supports the interpretive tradition that finds the law
by drawing legal principles from between the lines of individual cases,
and views cases as evidence of the law, rather than the law itself.
2 6
Hope's second departure from the Anderson-Saucier line regards the
relationship between general standards and clearly established law.
Hope rejected the "rigid gloss," exemplified by Robles, and refocused
the inquiry on whether the official had "fair warning" that the con-
duct was unconstitutional.2 7
220 Id.
221 Id. at 326.
The Eleventh Circuit did not provide an adequate explanation. The court simply de-
clared that "[i] n Ort, the defendant was refused water while at a work site, until he agreed to do
his job of carrying the water to the work site." Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975, 981 (1lth Cir.
2001) (internal citations omitted).
223 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 744 (2002).
224 Id. at 743.
225 This view of clearly established law was expressed in Judge Seymour's dissent in Herring v.
Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1181 (10th Cir. 2000) (Seymour, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe majority ex-
trapolates from the Supreme Court's bare holding ... without addressing the underlying analy-
sis and reasoning.... ."). See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
226 Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia dissented from Hope. Hope, 536
U.S. at 748 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent found the lower courts ruling to be a correct
reading of Anderson's and Saucier's requirement that the right be established "in a more particu-
larized, and hence more relevant, sense." Id. at 753 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635
(1987)). The dissent further rejected the common law reading of Ort. Echoing the Herring ma-
jority, Justice Thomas's dissent criticized the majority's reading as relying on "dicta [implying]
that a guard might have violated a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights by denying him water."
Id. at 762.
227 Hope did not elaborate on how the fair warning standard should work in practice. Vinyard
v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2002), a case vacated and remanded by Hope, understood
that Hope created a sliding scale between the reprehensibility of the conduct and the need for
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The fair warning standard allows the court to employ more tradi-
tional modes of interpretation. Here, departmental regulations, state
law, legal analogies, and even common sense are relevant to whether
the law is clearly established. Hope creates the possibility of moving
away from the idea that law is found exclusively in the Federal Re-
porter, and restructures qualified immunity to make it more com-
patible with general standard inquiries.
In fact, Hope itself paved the way for expanding the domain of
norms that can create clearly established law22s and took notice of a
Department of Justice ("DOJ") communication advising Alabama
prison authorities that several practices, including use of the hitching
posts, were improper. Even though there was no evidence that the
officers who restrained Plaintiff Hope were aware of the DOJ's posi-
tion, the court held that the DOJ communication "lends support to
the view that reasonable officials.., should have realized" that their
actions violated the Eighth Amendment.
229
clearly established precedents. Vinyard envisioned a three-tiered structure. In some cases the
words of the relevant federal statute, or of the Constitution itself, are specific enough to clearly
establish the law even in the total absence of case law. Id. at 1350. In other cases, the court looks
to decided law, which itself divides into two categories. Some cases include "broad statements
of principle ... not tied to particularized facts" that can clearly establish law, applicable in the
future to different sets of detailed facts. Id. at 1351. Vinyard held, however, that "there is a pre-
sumption against wide principles of law" and that these broad statements must clearly establish
the law "with obvious clarity." Id. Finally, if there is no broad precedent declaring unconstitu-
tionality, the court looks to "precedent that is tied to the facts." Id. Vinyard held that "most judi-
cial precedents are tied to particularized facts and fall into this [third] category." Id. at 1351-
52. For cases in this class, qualified immunity applies if the official actions are "fairly distin-
guishable" from the precedents. Id. at 1352. On the other hand, if the conduct of the official is
"materially similar, the precedent can clearly establish the applicable law." Id.
228 Which sources of law create clearly established law has been the source of much conten-
tion. Compare Tribble v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that all case law,
including decisions of other circuit courts of appeals, district courts, and state courts, are rele-
vant to the clearly established inquiry), with Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d
1171, 1177 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding that, in general, the Sixth Circuit looks only to Supreme
Court, Sixth Circuit and forum state supreme court decisions). See also Richard B. Saphire,
Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases and the Role of State Decisional Law, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 621,
623-24 (1993) (noting the federal court's failure to use state law decisions to clearly establish
the law); Jonathan M. Stemerman, Unclearly Establishing Qualified Immunity: What Sources of Law
May Be Used To Determine Whether the Law Is "Clearly Established" in the Third Circuit, 47 VILL. L.
REV. 1221 (2002) (indicating that courts do not agree on what authorities may be used to
clearly establish the law). Prior to Hope, it seemed well-settled that state law and departmental
regulations and communiques could not demonstrate that the law was clearly established law.
See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 (1984) (rejecting the argument that qualified immunity is
lost due to a violation of a state statute or regulation); Doe v. Delie 257 F.3d 309, 319 (3d Cir.
2000) ("To overcome qualified immunity, Doe's clearly established right must be the federal
right on which the claim for relief is based."). But see Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of
Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 2003) (basing a clearly established inquiry on accounts
from local newspapers and materials covered in officer training courses).
M Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 745 (2002).
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Hope's reception has been mixed. 30  Some courts, most notably
the Eleventh Circuit panels on remand, insisted that Hope changes lit-
tle. l Other courts concede that Hope reigns in some of the most
generous grants of immunity but otherwise leaves the doctrine un-
changed.232 Notably, the First Circuit's en banc decision in Savard
3
5
was decided after Hope, and the Fifth Circuit has likewise issued two
230 This is, in part, because the opinion itself plods through cases from Harlow to Saucier, ty-
ing them together with an aura of consistency. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 739-41. In truth, Justice
Stevens' decision however, remains conceptually at odds with these cases and refers back to the
theories reflected in his dissents in Navarette and Anderson, and to Justice Ginsburg's dissent in
Saucier.
23 See, e.g., Willingham v. Loughnan 321 F.3d 1299 (lth Cir. 2003). The first Willingham
panel held that "[a]lmost always, to establish the law clearly in the context of the Fourth
Amendment, a materially similar case must have already decided that what the police officer
was doing was unlawful." 261 F.3d 1178, 1187 (11th Cir. 2001). On remand, and with instruc-
tions to be reconsidered in light of Hope, the Eleventh Circuit stood by its original analysis of
the immunity issue stating, "[o]ur earlier conclusion remains unaffected by the Supreme
Court's decision in Hope," and went so far as to suggest that "[d ] ecisions of this Court before the
Supreme Court's Hope decision demonstrate that the law of the Circuit harmoniously complies
with the Supreme Court's reminder." 321 F.3d at 1303-04. Another Eleventh Circuit case ex-
hibited a similar pattern. The court's first decision in Vaughan v. Cox, 264 F.3d 1027 (11th Cir.
2001), was vacated by the Supreme Court in light of Hope. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit
stood by its original decision granting the officer qualified immunity. Vaughan, 316 F.3d 1210,
1214, cert. denied, 539 U.S. 904 (2003) ("For qualified immunity purposes, therefore, we ask
whether officers had 'arguable probable cause' ... [i]n our prior opinion, we concluded that
Deputy Cox had arguable probable cause and we reaffirm that decision today.") (internal cita-
tions omitted). Thereafter, the court, sua sponte, granted a rehearing. In reversing its two
prior decisions, the court, presumably based on its new understanding of Hope, denied the offi-
cers qualified immunity. Vaughan, 343 F.3d at 1333 ("Applying [the general standard] in a
common-sense way, a reasonable officer would have known that firing into the cabin of a
pickup truck ... would transform the risk of an accident on the highway into a virtual cer-
tainty.").
The Eleventh Circuit still seems confused about the role of factually/materially similar case
law. Compare Storck v. City of Coral Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11 th Cir. 2003) (deciding this
issue post-Hope, and even citing to it, while adhering in substance, if not in name, to the "mate-
rially similar" standard), and Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 954 n.6 (11th Cir.
2003) ("[P]ublic officials are not obligated to be creative or imaginative in drawing analogies
nor do we require them to construe general legal formulations that have not once been applied
to a specific set of facts by any binding judicial authority.") (internal quotations omitted), with
Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264-65 (11th Cir. 2004) (arguing that
Hope abrogated this restrictive gloss on qualified immunity). A discussion of the effects of Hope
on Eleventh Circuit law can be found in Amanda K. Eaton, Optical Illusions: The Hazy Contours of
the Clearly Established Law and the Effects of Hope v. Pelzer on the Qualified Immunity Doctrine, 38 GA.
L. REV. 661 (2004). Finally, to see another conflicting approach to Hope see Estep v. Dallas
County. 310 F.3d 353, 360 (5th Cir. 2002) ("[P]re-existing law must dictate, that is, truly com-
pel ... the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that what the de-
fendant is doing violates federal law in the circumstances.") (quoting Lassiter v. Ala. A. & M. Univ.,
28 F.3d 1146, 1150 (lth Cir. 1994) (en banc)). Lassiter, of course, was one of the cases criti-
cized by the Supreme Court in Hope, and Estep was published four months after Hope.
232 See, e.g., Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2002) (reiterating Hope's posi-
tion that officers have a "right to fair notice.").
233 338 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2003). See supra text accompanying notes 76-106 (discussing the rea-
soning in Savard).
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fractured en banc opinions grappling with applying the clearly estab-
lished standard in both the rule refinement and general standard
contexts.
2 s4
B. Brosseau: The Code Approach
Whatever the Court intended to change in Hope, its most recent
exposition of the qualified immunity standard in Brosseau v. Hauge
2 3
5
pulls back to the analysis staked out in Anderson and Saucier. Brosseau
presented an excessive force claim against an officer who shot a sus-
pect fleeing an alleged crime scene by car. The Court of Appeals, re-
lying largely on Hope, found that the violation was sufficiently clear so
that general excessive force standards set forth in Graham and Garner
established the law and defeated a claim of qualified immunity.
236
The Supreme Court reversed in a short per curiam opinion, hold-
ing that while there is no doubt that the general standards were
clearly established, the law was not specifically settled in light of the
particular facts facing Officer Brosseau. s7 While Plaintiff argued that
the law was clearly established by several more specific holdings ap-
plying excessive force standards to car chases and getaways, the Court
quickly dismissed these precedents, stating:
These three cases taken together undoubtedly show that this area is one
in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case. None of
them squarely governs the case here; they do suggest that Brosseau's ac-
tions fell in the "'hazy border between excessive and acceptable force."'
The cases by no means "cleary establish" that Brosseau's conduct vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment.
Finally, in a brief footnote, without any analysis, the Court dismissed
several other cases cited by plaintiff and stated that they postdated
the events in question. 9
Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter. Repeating themes voiced as
240far back as his dissent in Navarette, Stevens held that this case in-
234 See McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (discussing
the state's obligation to protect its citizens from the actions of third-party tortfeasors); see also
Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (discussing qualified immunity in the
context of a First Amendment general standard claim). Compare McClendon, 305 F.3d at 331-32
(granting qualified immunity in a majority per curiam opinion), with McClendon, 305 F.3d at
340-41 (Parker,j., dissenting) (arguing to deny qualified immunity).
255 125 S. Ct. 596 (2004).
26 See Haugen v. Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 873-75 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding Brosseau's use of
force to be a "clear violation" of Garner).
237 See Brosseau, 125 S. Ct. at 599-600 (describing the difficulty of applying any other case
directly to this one because none of them are precisely on point).
2M8 id. at 600 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)).
239 Id. at 600 n.4.
240 See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 569 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the majority did not examine carefully the factual basis for the defense); see also Wilson v. Layne,
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volved factual, rather than legal, uncertainty and that the entire issue
should be tried to the jury.24'
Justice Breyer filed a concurrence joined by Justices Scalia and
Ginsburg. ' Breyer argued that Saucider's requirement that the consti-
tutional question is decided before the clearly established question
should be overruled. According to the concurrence, the procedural
rule "requires courts unnecessarily to decide difficult constitutional
questions when there is available an easier basis for the decision (e.g.,
qualified immunity) that will satisfactorily resolve the case before the
court."2 43 Justice Breyer favors returning to a version of immunity that
places less emphasis on the distinction between "law" and its "clearly
established" cousin.
Brosseau takes a sharp turn from Hope and reinforces the problems
arising in general standard cases. The Court almost openly admits
that, on the one hand, the general standard is too vague to clearly es-
tablish any law, while at the same time, more specific cases decided
under the standard are too specific to cover divergent fact patterns.
Under this approach, factually intensive cases present an almost in-
surmountable obstacle for § 1983 plaintiffs.
244
The Court's outright dismissal of the "postdated" specific case law
is similarly disturbing.245 While under the Hope-inspired "fair notice"
standard there may be some logic to granting less precedential effect
to cases decided after the events in question (ignoring the fact that
the 'notice' proceeds under the dubious assumption that police offi-
cers spend their evening reading slip copies of the F.3d), the Court's
categorical dismissal is premised on a code-based legal theory deeply
at odds with traditional common law interpretation and analysis. Ex-
cluding cases decided after the events in question presents a vision of
law where the law is limited to narrow readings of officially sanc-
tioned materials. Whatever the theoretical merits of such a system,
this conception is deeply incompatible with prevailing traditions re-
garding legal reading, writing, and analysis.
526 U.S. 603, 618 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing
qualified immunity and how the majority misapplied it based on the facts of this case); Ander-
son v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 647 (1987) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (stating that the majority did
not adhere to principles of the Fourth Amendment when applying qualified immunity in this
case).
241 See Brosseau, 125 S. Ct. at 601 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing whether or not Brosseau
was entitled to qualified immunity, and concluding that "that question should be answered by a
jury").
242 Id. at 600-01 (Breyer, J., concurring).
243 Id. at 601.
244 See Brosseau, 125 S. Ct. at 599 (noting that the "high level of generality" in the precedential
case could not be dispositive except for "obvious" cases).
245 See id. at 600 (dismissing Cole v. Bone, and Smith v. Freland).
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A final comment is reserved for the Breyer concurrence. ' 46 While
the sentiment that cases should be disposed of via the path of least
resistance has its merits, the structure of the current immunity doc-
trine makes this position untenable. If cases could be dismissed for
not being "clearly established," there would be no way to refine and
elaborate constitutional norms and values except in all but the most
egregious cases. For example, in Wilson the Court held that although
media ride-alongs were unconstitutional they are not "clearly estab-
lished. 2 4 8 While the Wilson defendants were not liable in tort, future
officers enabling media participation are subject to liability since Wil-
son had "clearly established" the principle. 44  Under the Breyer
method however, Wilson, and every media ride-along, would be dis-




The tug between the Court's most recent opinions reflects the
conceptual tension embedded in immunity doctrine: whether clearly
established law makes any sense in light of our traditions of reading,
writing, and analyzing cases. The cases extending from Harow, 1 to
Anderson, to Saucier, have turned immunity from a balancing test
designed to find the "best attainable accommodation of competing
values,, 254 into a regimented "question of law" devoid of contextual
analysis.
Because common law cases are not designed to produce outcomes
that will easily satisfy the quest for "clearly established law," courts in-
246 Id. (Breyer,J. concurring).
247 The concurrence apparently favors a return to the time when the immunity doctrine did
not reflect a clear analytical distinction between "law" and "clearly established law." See, e.g.,
Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 (1984) (failing to distinguish between actions whose uncon-
stitutionality is clearly established and actions that, while unconstitutional, are not clearly estab-
lished under the qualified immunity standard). Over time, the Court gradually endorsed a
conception that distinguished these ideas and presented them as conceptually distinct. See
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) (holding that qualified immunity represents a "threshold
question," but failing to clearly distinguish between law and clearly established law); Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 194 (2001) (distinguishing specifically between the constitutional violation
and "clearly established" prongs of the immunity inquiry).
248 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 605-06 (1999).
249 Id. at 603.
250 For example, see the discussion in Jennings v. Stillwater, 383 F.3d 1199, 1208 (10th Cir.
2004), regarding whether the cause of action presented in Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 1547, 1557
(10th Cir. 1995), was dismissed on constitutional or clearly established grounds.
251 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
252 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
253 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
2 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
255 See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 589 (1997) ("The [Harlow] court's clear and con-
vincing evidence requirement applies to the plaintiffs showing of improper intent (a pure issue




evitably stumble. "[T] he law's elaboration from case to case '' " re-
quires abstraction, synthesis, and analysis-the very tools that are un-
available under the clearly established inquiry. Thus, since Harlow, a
near-endless number of panel dissents, en bancs and associated peti-
tions, and Supreme Court opinions have fought against strict applica-
tion of the bifurcated immunity analysis. This tradition is reflected in
Hope2 57 Lanier5s and Currier,!55 as well as in the dissenting voices of
Savard, Herring,26 Anderson 2 Wilson2 63 and Saucier.2" In each of
these cases, the refusal to adhere to the tight strictures of the clearly
established mandate demonstrates the discomfort with the interpre-
tative premises lying at the core of the Anderson/Saucier model of im-
munity.
V. CONCLUSIONS: LEGAL INTERPRETATION IN THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION
A. Stability and Change in the Common Law
Both the common law's admirers and critics have commented on
the malleability of the legal tradition. To its critics, this open-
endedness reflects a jurisprudence that produces a set of confused,
conflicting and irrational results.26" Certainty is never guaranteed and
even an educated guess requires the expensive services of a trained
practitioner. To its admirers, the common law strikes the perfect bal-
ance between the stability required to ensure confidence in commer-
cial, personal, and governmental affairs, and the flexibility needed to
266ensure that the law reflects contemporary social policy and reality.
Like any tradition, the common law maintains a dialectic between
tradition and change, and between continuity and ingenuity. Histo-
rians argue over whether changes in the common law dominate over
267continuity, or whether the reverse is a more accurate description.
256 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
257 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
258 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
259 242 F.3d 905 (10th Cir. 2001).
260 338 F.3d 23, 34 (1st Cir. 2003) (Barnes,J., dissenting).
261 218 F.3d 1171, 1181 (10th Cir. 2000) (Seymour,J., dissenting).
262 483 U.S. 635, 658-59 (1987) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
26 526 U.S. 603, 618 (1999) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
264 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
265 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 48, at 1758-64 (noting that positivists like Austin de-
emphasized the analytical progressions and logical connection from one case to the next).
See generally EISENBERG, supra note 125 (arguing that social propositions are relevant in all
common law cases).
267 Of contemporary writers, James Gordley's, The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some
Unfinished Business, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1815 (2000), is a good representative of the change-
dominant theory, while David Ibbetson's A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
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The analysis of qualified immunity suggests that one might profitably
approach this problem by considering the difference between sub-
stantive doctrine on the one hand and interpretive methods on the
other.
The evolution of immunity doctrine itself reflects this lesson. The
substantive elements of immunity have undergone several incarna-
tions.2 6 s Ann Woolhandler has demonstrated that at different points
in time, immunity depended in turn on at least five conditions:" 1 269
whether the action was deemed illegal, whether the actor exceeded
the scope of authority,2 7 0 whether the official occupied a high or low
271government office, whether the action was ministerial or discre-
272 273tionary, or whether the relief sought was monetary or coercive.
However, despite change in the substantive results, the law's analytic
and interpretative structure remained fairly constant. The decision
to grant immunity rests on a contextual analysis of the relevant
precedents and policies justifying immunity.274
Beginning with Butz27 5 and Harlow, 276 the Court tinkered with the
analytical method itself 2 7 7 The Court asked the law to reconceptual-
ize its interpretation of itself. Cases were not to be analyzed as ex-
pressions of judicial reasoning to guide future courts but were to be
reduced to blackletter legal soundbites sharply limited to their facts.
These literary and interpretive traditions, however, cannot simply be
eliminated. They are integral to the law's operation. Legal "rules,"
which are little more than abstracted holdings from previous cases,
must be interpreted and modified to the facts of downstream cases.
Holdings are not self-applying. Further, decisions often include sev-
eral distinct but interlocking legal bases, and the job is left to the
OBLIGATIONS, 294-302 (1999), is a good example of the stability-dominant theory. Of course,
the high-water mark of the stability theory can be found in FREDRICK POLLOCK, THE GENIUS OF
THE COMMON LAW (Lawbook Exchange 2000) (1912).
268 See Woolhandler, supra note 7 (tracing the development of immunity for federal officials).
269 See id. at 414-22 (describing the "legality model" adopted during the Marshall Court).
270 See id. at 411 ("Courts using a discretionary model avoid total abandonment of the rule of
law by drawing... distinctions between ... areas where judgment is legitimately exercised and
where it is not.").
271 See id. at 430 (noting that the Taney Court "granted less expansive immunity to officials
below cabinet level").
272 See id. at 426 ("[The] failure to perform a ministerial act could subject [a government]
official to damages liability.").
273 See id. at 409-10 ("Early in the twentieth century, however, the legality model [for immu-
nity] came substantially to dominate the field of coercive relief, while both the legality and dis-
cretion models continued to struggle for predominance in actions for [monetary] damages.").
274 See generally id. (examining the doctrine of immunity for federal officials).
275 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
276 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
277 See supra text accompanying notes 23-26 (discussing the Butz/Harlow approach to quali-
fied immunity, resulting in the "objectively reasonable" test).
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downstream court to identify the "correct" basis for the decision.
Much the same is true for distinguishing material facts from those in-
serted for rhetorical flourish. Overall, the binding nature of prece-
dent is to be found more in its reasoning-as understood by the de-
ciding court-than by its holding. 7 8 Similarly, cases are notorious for
only deciding the fairly limited question presented to the court, and
the doctrine of dicta specifically disfavors forward-looking specula-
tions. The common law is content to leave marginal and difficult
questions for another day, when those facts are squarely presented to
the court.
While there is nothing logically necessary about this system, much
of our legal writing, thinking, and analysis is predicated on maintain-
ing these internal assumptions. In this way, the law's doctrinal insta-
bility is balanced by the stability of the mechanisms through which
the law is created, refined, and applied. The aura of continuity is
achieved, not by reaching the same result every time, but by subject-
ing each case to the same methods of analysis and interpretation.
Each case thus appears to be part of a seamless tradition, even if the
bottom-end doctrine sustains significant modifications.
Immunity doctrine does not work well because it rejects the inter-
pretative methods that form the basis of this tradition. Far beyond
steering the doctrine in a new direction, the "clearly established"
mode alters the very assumptions used to understand and decide
cases. This move creates a nearly irreconcilable rupture in the opera-
tion of the common law, and exposes the fault lines in the law's evo-
lution from case to case. The Supreme Court's attempts to harmo-
nize the doctrine have been a dismal failure: 9 The problem is not
the lack of clarity, but rather a lack of parity between the tradition
that generates substantive constitutional tort law and the interpretive
demands of clearly established law.
B. The Surprising Endurance of Common Law Mythology
There is a second, and, perhaps, even more surprising meta-
lesson. In classic common-law mythology, tension between dynamism
and stability was held together by the idea that legal innovation was
grounded in legal tradition. Reported cases are merely evidence of
the law, and not the "Law" itself. Law exists as a set of interlocking
278 See Schauer, Precedent, supra note 125, at 595-602 (discussing how the deciding court es-
tablishes the doctrine set forth in the precedent case).
279 See, e.g., Kerman v. New York, 374 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2004) (struggling to define the role of
qualified immunity once a jury has found the conduct unreasonable as a matter of Fourth
Amendment principles).
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legal principles-the "seamless web" of the law. 80 Legal development
or revelation occurs when a new idea is found (via legal analysis)
within the existing law. Lawyers discuss legal trends, contrapose con-
flicting lines of precedent, and re-characterize familiar cases, all in an
effort to demonstrate how the new principle is merely an explicit af-
firmation of pre-existing law.
Of course, in the post-realist world of American legal thought this
conception is quite unfashionable. Legal realists notoriously reject
the idea that the law consists of a "brooding omnipresence in the
sky." Realism has died a thousand deaths, and no one wants to be-
lieve that lawyering consists mainly of archeological excavation.
Yet the theological rejection has had surprisingly little effect on
praxis. Despite being shorn of these medieval myths, the everyday
operation of the law demonstrates that this mythical conception is
alive and well. Lawyers still reason interstitially from one case to an-
other, discovering rather than creating the law. Similarly, forward-
looking decisions are non-binding dicta; the law is to remain in its la-
tent, implied state until needed to decide a case. Doctrinal explica-
tion remains overwhelmingly backward-looking, and lawyers prefer to
find innovative theories within the reported case law. Moreover,
while forward-looking "policy" concerns have taken on increased sig-
nificance, these arguments are most compelling when located in the
decisional law. Lord Coke would be happy to know that in the
twenty-first century (in America) the most comfortable form of legal
innovation remains the "this-is-what-the-law-has-always-done" argu-
ment.
The interaction between "clearly established" and common law
emphasizes just how dependent the common law is on its traditional,
interpretive assumptions. The "clearly established" system offers an
example of what the legal landscape would look like if the law were
deprived of its analytical reasoning, and its ability to reach back into
the storehouse of case law and "discover" a new legal doctrine.
Rather than seeing the law's evolution from case to case, the "clearly
established" perspective finds unpredictable developments28 ' and in-
conclusive analogies.82 Where the common lawyer finds a context-
sensitive system that can account for subtle factual variations, the
280 The origin of this phrase is analyzed in Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital World: Computer Net-
works and Cyberspace, 38 VILL. L. REv. 403, 403 n.3 (1993).
281 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (finding that the unconstitutionality of al-
lowing media to accompany police during a search of a private home was not anticipated by
prior precedents).
282 See, e.g., Savard v. Rhode Island, 338 F.3d 23, 30 (1st Cir. 2003) (en banc) ("In the end, we
recognize that both Swain and Arruda offer valuable insights [to this case on strip searches] but
that neither is a very exact match.").
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code-based model finds an endless minefield of irreconcilable hold-
ings.
The discussion of qualified immunity results in the surprising re-
alization that common law practice has survived and flourished de-
spite the rejection of its underlying theory. Legal academics may be
the priests who lost their faith but kept their jobs. But judges and
lawyers are the parishioners who, despite their agnosticism, continue
to adhere to the central tenets of common law practice.
